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1. Introduction  
1.1. Multilateral versus preferential trade – Where are we now? 
The proliferation of preferential trade agreements
1
 (PTAs) has been significant since the 
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995; as of 1 February 2016 
there were 454 notifications of physical PTAs received by the WTO, and overall 419 PTAs 
were in force.
2
 This seems somewhat antithetical to the objectives of the WTO, as its 
purpose is to promote globalisation and multilateral trade liberalisation, and to ensure the 
same trading possibilities to all its members.
3
 However, it must be kept in mind that 
different types of PTAs have existed in the international trading system well before the 
WTO was established, and therefore they must not be regarded as a recent phenomenon.
4
 
In fact, already in 1996 Bhagwati stressed that the WTO will have to face the phenomenon 
of proliferation of PTAs and that equilibrium must be found between the two systems.
5
 
These agreements used to be mostly agreed upon at a regional level, which is why many 
authors still refer to them as regional trade agreements (RTAs).
6
 However, the number of 
PTAs among members that are not in geographic proximity is constantly growing.
7
   
PTAs are inherently contradicting the non-discrimination goals of the WTO, as they 
specifically give preferential treatment to PTA members as opposed to other WTO 
members, with the aim of reaching a deeper level of integration. Preferential trade has been 
argued to be both a building block and a stumbling block to multilateral trade 
liberalisation, in other words to either increase or decrease trade liberalisation at a 
multilateral level between all WTO members.
8
 Reasons for members to seek preferential 
                                                 
1
 The WTO system recognises several types of PTAs: the GATT refers to free trade areas and customs unions 
while the GATS only refers to economic integration and trade liberalisation in general. In this paper I will 
use the term preferential trade agreement (PTA) to refer to all these agreements and integration schemes. 
2
 World Trade Organization, Regional Trade Agreemenets Gateway, 
<www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm> accessed 26. August 2015. 
3
 Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum and Petros C. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization: Law, 
Practice, and Policy (2
nd
 edition, Oxford University press: Oxford, 2006) at 594-550. 
4
 According to the world trade report of 2011, the first wave of regionalism began in the late 1950s and 
1960s, with the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 and the European Free 
Trade Agreement (EFTA) in 1960. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2011: The WTO and 
Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co‐Existence to Coherence (2011) at 52.  
5
 Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘The Agenda of the WTO’ in Pitou van Dijck and Gerrit Faber (eds.), Challenges to the 
New World Trade Organization (Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 1996) at 27. 
6
 Gabrielle Marceau and Julian Wyatt, ‘Dispute Settlement Regimes Intermingled: Regional Trade 
Agreements and the WTO’, 1 Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2010) 67–95 at 68.  
7
 Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization, supra note 3 at 594.  
8
 For a discussion about the benefits and negative aspects of PTAs see for example Chad Damro, ‘The 
Political Economy of Regional Trade Agreements’ in Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino (eds.), Regional 
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trade instead of investing their time and efforts in deeper multilateral liberalisation are 
numerous: PTAs are often seen as more beneficial as they involve key trading partners, 
offer better chances of success as the number of members involved is smaller, and also 
because multilateral trade negotiations often fail or take up significantly longer.
9
 For 
example, the current Doha round was launched in November 2001, but the negotiations 
still continue to fail.
10
 Deeper integration is therefore easier to achieve through preferential 
than multilateral trade. This paper does not focus on the politics or economics behind 
preferential trade, and therefore it suffices to say that by evaluating the current situation, 
the relevance of PTAs seems to be growing and the effects of preferential trade agreements 
to the WTO and multilateral trade in general must be taken seriously. 
1.2. Overlapping jurisdictions – Is there a problem?  
Jurisdiction refers to the limits of the legal competence of a regulatory authority to create, 
apply or enforce rules.
11
 Overlaps of jurisdictions in dispute settlement refer to situations 
where the same dispute could be initiated under two distinct dispute settlement systems.
12
 
Conflicts arise when two tribunals actually provide jurisdiction over the same dispute.
13
 As 
the number of different international regimes and tribunals has multiplied over the past 
years,
14
 overlaps of jurisdictions have become commonplace in the international arena.
15
 
The phenomenon is part of the fragmentation of international law, which is a result of the 
rise of specialised regimes that have different interests and biases.
16
 The arbitral tribunal 
                                                                                                                                                    
Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006) 23-42; David A. 
Gantz, ‘Regional Trade Agreements’ in Daniel Bethlehem, Donald McRae, Rodney Neufeld and Isabelle 
Van Damme (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Trade Law (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
2009) 237-267. 
9
 John Whalley, ‘Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?’ in Jeffrey A. Frankel (ed.), The 
Regionalization of the World Economy (University of Chicago Press, 1998) 63-90 at 71.  
10
 Tilman Krüger, ‘Moving Ahead While Standing Still: Dynamics of Institutional Evolution in a Gridlocked 
WTO’, 5 European Yearbook of International Economic Law (2014) 115-140 at 118.  
11
 Christopher Staker, ‘Jurisdiction’ in International Law’ in Malcom D. Evans (ed.), International Law (4th 
edition, Oxford University Press: New York, 2014) 309-335 at 309. 
12
 Kyung Kwak and Gabrielle Marceau, ‘Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction between the World Trade 
Organization and Regional Trade Agreements’ in Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino (eds.), Regional Trade 
Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006), 465-523 at 467. 
13
 Isabelle Van Damme, ‘Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Interpretation’ in Bethlehem, McRae, Neufeld 
and Van Damme (eds.), The Oxford Handbook, supra note 8, 298-342 at 303. 
14
 See for example Cesare P.R. Romano, ‘The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of 
the Puzzle’, 31 N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics (1999) 709-751 at 710. 
15
 Luiz Eduardo Salles, Forum Shopping in International Adjudication: The Role of Preliminary Objections 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 20-21. 
16
 These specialisations refer to different fields of international law such as international human rights law, 
international environmental law and international investment law. See for example Martti Koskenniemi ‘The 
Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ 70(1) The Modern Law Review (2007) 1-
30. 
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established under the United Nations Convention the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
17
 stated 
in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case that  
“But the Tribunal recognizes as well that it is a commonplace of International law and 
State practice for more than one treaty to bear upon a particular dispute. There is no 
reason why a given act of a State may not violate its obligations under more than one 
treaty. There is frequently a parallelism of treaties, both in their substantive content and in 
their provisions for settlement of disputes arising thereunder.”18 
Overlapping jurisdictions cause availability of multiple fora, which in turn often makes 
multiple litigations possible.
19
 Kwak and Marceau have defined three different types of 
overlaps that might occur: firstly, two fora might claim to have exclusive jurisdiction over 
the same matter; secondly, one of the fora might claim to have exclusive jurisdiction while 
the other offers jurisdiction on a permissive basis for the same matter; thirdly, two fora 
might offer non-mandatory jurisdiction for the same dispute.
20
 International tribunals are 
independent from one another, and therefore the fact that one tribunal has jurisdiction over 
a specific issue does not mean that other tribunals are deprived from jurisdiction over the 
same or similar issues.
21
  
This phenomenon can be seen as a positive thing, ensuring that all aspects of complex and 
multifaceted disputes are resolved, and also bringing security to those who have suffered 
from a breach of another state.
22
 It is also possible that competition among different 
tribunals prompts better quality decisions and less time-consuming proceedings.
23
 It has 
been argued that the emergence of multiple tribunals indirectly enhances the overall 
legitimacy as tribunals keep a critical eye over one another.
24
 It can also strengthen the rule 
of law and prompt the development of international law.
25
 However, as jurisdiction is most 
often no longer established at an ad-hoc basis but tribunals have automatic jurisdiction, 
                                                 
17
 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature on 10 December 1982, 
Montego Bay Jamaica, in force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 397, SopS 50/1996 (UNCLOS). 
18
 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and New Zealand v Japan), Award of 4. August 2000 (Jurisdiction 
and admissibility) United Nations Reports on International Arbitral Awards, vol. XXIII (2004) at 40, para. 52 
(Southern Bluefin Tuna). 
19
 Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 2003) at 154. 
20
 Kwak and Marceau, ‘Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction’, supra note 12 at 468. 
21
 Salles, Forum Shopping in International Adjudication, supra note 15 at 156.  
22
 ibid at 20. 
23
 ibid at 20. 
24
 ibid at 20.  
25
 Nikolaos Lavranos, ‘Regulating Competing Jurisdictions Among International Courts and Tribunals’, 68 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2008), 575-621 at 576. 
  
4 
 
based on an “inbuilt consent”, forum shopping and other problems relating to the overlap 
of jurisdictions are also likely to arise.
26
 In establishing tribunals, their compatibility with 
already existing ones is not considered, which increases the risks associated with 
overlapping jurisdictions.
27
 
There are several issues that may be caused by the availability of multiple fora in the same 
dispute. Forum shopping strategies may be inconsistent with what the parties have actually 
agreed on about forum selection in dispute settlement.
28
 Parallel litigation, subsequent or 
even simultaneous, uses up scarce judicial resources and raises litigation costs to all 
parties.
29
 The biggest issue is the loss of predictability, as multiple litigations may lead to 
two conflicting decisions, which do not settle the dispute between the parties.
30
 There is 
also unpredictability in multiple proceedings with regard to the finality of decisions, as 
relitigation threatens the authority of the first judgement.
31
 As there is no “supreme court” 
in the international law arena that would settle the inconsistency, conflicting decisions may 
lead to a continuing dispute between the parties, despite the efforts and resources used for 
settling it.
32
 However, it must be noted that the problems mostly arise when different 
proceedings are truly competing with one another in terms of identical parties, identical 
fact patterns and similar legal claims.
33
 If two tribunals decide on different aspects of the 
dispute, the overlap might not be problematic.
34
  
One prime example of the availability of multiple fora and the possibilities it offers for 
forum shopping is the MOX Plant Case,
35
 where Ireland initiated a dispute concerning a 
MOX facility in Sellafield before the arbitral tribunals established under the UNCLOS and 
under the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
                                                 
26
 Salles, Forum Shopping in International Adjudication, supra note 15 at 21-23. 
27
 Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions, supra note 19 at 8. 
28
 Salles, Forum Shopping in International Adjudication, supra note 15 at 30. Parties may have for example 
agreed not to initiate the WTO dispute settlement system. This issue is at the core of this thesis and will be 
addressed in depth below. 
29
 Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions, supra note 19 at 155. 
30
 Salles, Forum Shopping in International Adjudication, supra note 15 at 30-31. 
31
 Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions, supra note 19 at 80. 
32
 Salles, Forum Shopping in International Adjudication, supra note 15 at 44. 
33
 Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions, supra note 19 at 155. 
34
 Joost Pauwelyn and Luiz Eduardo Salles ‘Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real) 
Concerns, (Im)Possible solutions’, 42 Cornell International Law Journal (2009) 77-119 at 84. The authors 
give an example of a situation where the ICJ decides issues of territorial delimitation while the WTO rules on 
trade issues. 
35
 UNCLOS Arbitral tribunal, MOX Plant Case, Order No. 3 (Ireland v. the United Kingdom), Award of 24 
June 2003, International Legal Materials, vol. 42 (2003) (the MOX Plant Case). 
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Atlantic (OSPAR).
36
 The case was also brought before the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ).
37
 The OSPAR tribunal gave its ruling without consideration of the other 
proceedings,
38
 whereas the arbitral tribunal established under the UNCLOS requested that 
the parties would first find out whether or not the ECJ had jurisdiction in the matter. The 
UNCLOS tribunal stated that it would be inappropriate to proceed further under such 
circumstances as the possibility of conflicting decisions would not help the parties to 
resolve the dispute.
39
 
In the WTO context, the issue of overlapping jurisdictions was most obviously present in 
the Softwood Lumber disputes between the United States and Canada. The disputes 
focused on Canada’s alleged subsidies and anti-dumping duties issued by the United States 
on softwood lumber products, which created several GATT/WTO and NAFTA 
procedures.
40
 Finally in 2006 the members settled the dispute, although the issue was later 
on raised again in international arbitration.
41
 The WTO tribunals did not address the 
parallel litigation once during the dispute settlement, and no coordination took place 
between the tribunals.
42
 
The WTO dispute settlement system appears to be compulsory and exclusive to disputes 
regarding WTO rights and obligations, and it has been referred to be a “quasi-automatic” 
system.
43
 The jurisdiction of the WTO is exclusive but not general, meaning that only the 
WTO tribunals have jurisdiction to assess breaches of WTO obligations, but also that only 
breaches of WTO obligations can be assessed in the WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings.
44
 Article 23 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)
45
 obliges 
members to abide by the rules of the agreement in case they consider their rights arising 
from the covered agreements to be nullified or impaired. Initiating the dispute settlement 
                                                 
36
 The Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Paris 1992, open 
for signature on 22 September 1992, in force 25 March 1988, replaces the Oslo and Paris Conventions, SopS 
51/1998 (OSPAR Convention). 
37
  Case C-459/03, Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland, Judgment of 30 May 2006, ECR I-
4635. 
38
 Dispute Concerning Access to Information under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention, Final Award of 2 
July 2003, International Law Reports, vol. 126 (2005) at 59-151. 
39
 The MOX Plant Case, supra note 35, para. 28. 
40
 Brooks E. Allen and Tommaso Soave, ‘Jurisdictional Overlap in WTO Dispute Settlement and Investment 
Arbitration’, 30(1) The Journal of the London Court of International Arbitration (2014) 1-58 at 33. 
41
 ibid at 33. 
42
 Allen and Soave, ‘Jurisdictional Overlap’, supra note 40 at 33. 
43
 Kwak and Marceau, ‘Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction’, supra note 12 at 469. 
44
 Van Damme, ‘Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Interpretation’, supra note 13 at 299-300. 
45
 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Marrakesh 15 April 1994, in force 1 
January 1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, SopS 5/1995, Article 23. 
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mechanism of the WTO requires only an allegation that a measure of another member 
impairs its trade benefits.
46
 The Appellate Body has affirmed that the member challenging 
a measure does not even have to prove to be an actual exporter of the product, as every 
WTO member is a potential exporter.
47
 Also, for a measure to be declared WTO 
inconsistent, the member challenging a measure does not have to prove that the measure 
has caused any actual trade effects.
48
 The WTO dispute settlement system therefore 
appears to be available for the members under any circumstances regarding any dispute 
relating to their WTO rights.  
However, it may well be that the same dispute can also be brought to the dispute settlement 
system of a PTA. PTAs usually include substantive rights and obligations that are parallel 
to those included in the WTO covered agreements.
49
 They usually also provide for their 
own dispute settlement mechanisms which, due to these parallel rights and obligations, are 
overlapping with the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO.
50
 Many PTAs even 
attempt to exclude the jurisdiction of the WTO in certain situations. This evidently creates 
an overlap of jurisdictions, where two different fora are available for the settlement of the 
same dispute. There are many instances in which the issue of multiple litigations could 
have been contested in the WTO proceedings
51
 and the WTO tribunals have indeed had to 
address the issue in the past.
52
 
1.3. Thesis plan 
By applying the method of legal dogmatics, I will examine whether the jurisdiction of a 
PTA can override the jurisdiction of the WTO, and whether the WTO tribunals have the 
powers to decline to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the jurisdiction of a PTA. I will 
                                                 
46
 Kwak and Marceau, ‘Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction’, supra note 12 at 467. 
47
 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale And Distribution of 
Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 9 September 1997, para. 136 (EC-Bananas). 
48
 Article 3.8 of the DSU states that “In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed 
under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or 
impairment. This means that there is normally a presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact 
on other Members parties to that covered agreement, and in such cases, it shall be up to the Member against 
whom the complaint has been brought to rebut the charge.” 
49
 Kwak and Marceau ‘Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction’, supra note 12 at 466. 
50
 ibid at 466. 
51
 For example in Canada – Periodicals and in US – Tuna II the issue could have been raised but was not. 
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, adopted 30 
July 1997 (Canada – Periodicals); Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2012 
(US – Tuna II). 
52
 Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry From Brazil, WT/DS241/R, adopted 
22 April 2003 (Argentina – Poultry); Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and 
Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, adopted 24 March 2006 (Mexico – Soft Drinks). 
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examine the effects that jurisdiction clauses included in PTAs could be considered to have 
on the jurisdiction of the WTO, and other possible ways to solve jurisdictional conflicts. 
This paper concentrates strictly on these preliminary questions of jurisdiction and 
admissibility, and I will not address other issues which might arise from the overlaps of 
jurisdictions between the WTO and PTAs.
53
 
The topic is divided into three main sections. I will first examine these overlaps as a 
normative issue, concentrating on jurisdictional clauses included in the WTO agreements 
and in PTAs. I will study the overall hierarchy of the two systems and the question of 
applicable law in the WTO dispute settlement system. The question in this section is, can a 
PTA jurisdiction clause modify WTO member’s rights and obligations arising from the 
covered agreements. I will then move on to consider the overlaps as a procedural question, 
setting aside the treaties and concentrating on rules of general international law established 
to govern the procedural issues in international adjudication. The question here is whether 
a parallel proceeding can by itself prevent WTO litigation. Lastly, I will study the powers 
of the WTO tribunals and their abilities to decline to exercise jurisdiction. Here I will also 
examine more closely the relevant WTO case law regarding this issue. I will finish the 
paper by giving a brief outlook of the issue from a policy perspective while also addressing 
the challenges the situation causes to the whole system.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53
 There are also other potential problems that can arise from the overlaps of jurisdictions between the WTO 
and PTAs. It is for example possible that by acting consistently with its PTA rights and obligations, or even 
aiming to fulfil the obligations stated in a ruling of a PTA tribunal, a member is found to be breaching its 
WTO obligations. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports Of Retreaded Tyres, 
WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 3 December 2007. 
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2. Jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and PTAs as a normative issue 
In international law, jurisdiction of a tribunal derives from the consent of the states. A state 
cannot therefore be subjected to the jurisdiction of a tribunal unless it has consented to it.
54
 
It is also normal that states make subsequent agreements that might affect the jurisdiction 
of different tribunals. In such cases it must be determined whether the later treaty has 
modified the prior treaty, and if it has, how.
55
 This analysis is relevant also in the WTO 
context, as members have signed a number of PTAs that contain provisions which exclude 
under certain conditions the seemingly mandatory jurisdiction of the WTO. This raises the 
question of the validity of these jurisdiction clauses. If such a dispute settlement provision 
is found valid and legal, it would mean that the parties can contract out of the jurisdiction 
of the WTO.  
Can the WTO members agree that the provisions of the DSU are not applicable in their 
trade disputes? Can the jurisdiction of the WTO be excluded in the first place? These are 
the questions to which I will try to find a solution in this first section. The main question is, 
whether a norm included in a non-WTO agreement can affect the WTO and its jurisdiction. 
I will address the issue of jurisdictional overlaps from normative perspective, determining 
the effects of these jurisdiction clauses to the jurisdiction of the WTO. I will first present 
the different types of jurisdiction clauses found in PTAs and explain why a conflict may 
arise. I will also assess whether there can truly be a conflict between different fora by 
analysing the concept of a conflict. I will then move on to addressing the conflicts first by 
studying the inherent conflict between the two systems, and then by examining the 
conflicts of applicable law and the conflict-solving principles of public international law. 
2.1. Jurisdiction clauses and their conflict-causing potential 
The jurisdiction of the WTO is stated in Article 23 of the DSU, which reads as follows: 
“When WTO members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification 
or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the 
attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and 
abide by, the rules and procedures of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.”56 Each WTO 
member has agreed to be bound by the jurisdiction of the WTO when becoming a member. 
                                                 
54
 Vaughan Lowe, ‘Overlapping Jurisdiction in International Tribnals’, 20 Australian Year Book of 
International Law (1999) 191-204 at 193.  
55
 ibid at 193. 
56
 Article 23.1 of the DSU. 
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The dispute settlement system is one of the cornerstones of the WTO, and it easily attracts 
jurisdiction over disputes with potential trade effects.
57
 No other court or tribunal is 
entitled to asses breaches of WTO obligations and members cannot even determine that a 
breach has occurred without first initiating a dispute in the WTO dispute settlement 
system.
58
  
However, PTAs often include jurisdiction clauses as well. There are different types of 
jurisdiction clauses, and one PTA might include several forms of them.
59
 For example the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
60
 and the Olivos Protocol for the 
Settlement of Disputes in Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR)
61
 include so called 
fork-in-the-road clauses which state that the first forum selected has exclusive jurisdiction 
in the matter. The choice of forum is irreversible, and the possibility to initiate the dispute 
under another forum is precluded.
62
 The purpose of such clauses is not to deem one forum 
more preferable than the other, but merely to avoid multiple litigations in the same 
matter.
63
 
Another type of jurisdiction clause is an anti-concurrent clause which prohibits parallel 
proceedings but allows subsequent proceedings on the same issue.
64
 An anti-concurrent 
type of clause can be found in the EU–Mexico FTA.65 By contrast, a preferential 
jurisdiction clause either gives exclusive jurisdiction to one forum or leaves the choice of 
forum to the respondent.
66
 PTAs include PTA-first clauses, which give the dispute 
settlement system of the PTA exclusive jurisdiction over certain types of disputes, but also 
WTO-first clauses, which favour the WTO dispute settlement. For example the NAFTA 
includes a PTA-first provision in relation to disputes concerning certain sanitary and 
                                                 
57
 Kwak and Marceau, ‘Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction’, supra note 12 at 467. 
58
 Article 23.2(a) of the DSU. 
59
 Son Tan Nguyen, ’The Applicability of RTA Jurisdiction Clauses in WTO Dispute Settlement’, 16 
International Trade and Business Law Review (2013) 254-294 at 256. 
60
 North American Free trade Agreement, signed 17 December 1992, in force 1 January 1994, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993), (NAFTA), Articles 2005(1) and 2005(6). 
61
 Olivos Protocol for the Settelement of Disputes in MERCOSUR, signed 18 February 2002, in force 10 
February 2004, 2251 UNTS 288 (Olivos Protocol) Article 1(2). 
62
 Salles, ‘Forum Shopping in International Adjudication’, supra note 15 at 245. 
63
 ibid at 245. 
64
 Nguyen, ’The Applicability of RTA Jurisdiction Clauses’, supra note 59 at 256. 
65
 2001/153/EC: Decision No 2/2001 of the EU-Mexico Joint Council of 27 February 2001 implementing 
Articles 6, 9, 12(2)(b) and 50 of the Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation 
Agreement Economic Partnership, Article 43(4). Official Journal of the European Communitie L 070, 
12/03/2001. 
66
 Nguyen, ’The Applicability of RTA Jurisdiction Clauses’, supra note 59 at 265. 
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phytosanitary measures
67
 and the EU–Chile Free Trade Agreement gives preference to the 
WTO dispute settlement in disputes relating to obligations that are equivalent under the 
two systems.
68
 It is also possible for a PTA to contain a provision excluding the possibility 
to appeal WTO panel reports.
69
 
There seems to be a conflict between the provisions establishing the jurisdiction of the 
WTO and the jurisdiction clauses included in PTAs. What happens if a member initiates a 
dispute in the WTO dispute settlement system, while at the same time being member to a 
PTA that includes a preferential jurisdiction clause? Or when a member brings a case in 
the WTO system after having already initiated the same dispute under a PTA that includes 
a fork-in-the-road clause? I will now study the elements of a conflict of norms. 
2.2. Normative conflict in the context of the WTO and PTAs 
The problems arising from the overlap of jurisdictions between the WTO and PTAs could 
be avoided by merely stating that the matter raised in the WTO context and in the PTA 
system are not the same, as the law governing the two proceedings is not the same.
70
 The 
WTO tribunal assesses the alleged breach of WTO obligations and the PTA tribunal 
assesses the situation in the light of PTA norms. Even if the provisions of the two treaties 
governing the dispute would be nearly identical, the applicable law would still be 
different.
71
 It was already noted that the problems of overlaps of jurisdictions are present 
only when the jurisdictions are truly competing, and the identity of legal claims was one of 
the aspects mentioned in this regard. 
However, after studying the concept of a conflict, this argument does not seem as 
persuasive. According to Pauwelyn, in order for a conflict of norms to exist there must be 
an overlap ratio materiae, personae and temporis.
72
 In this context, the overlap ratio 
personae is fulfilled as the legal subjects of the conflict are parties that are members to 
                                                 
67
 NAFTA Article 2005(4), also Article 2005(3). 
68
 Agreement establishing  an  association  between  the  European  Community  and  its  Member  States,  of  
the  one part,  and  the  Republic  of  Chile, of the other part, in force February 2003, Article 189(4)(c). 
69
 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘How to Win a World Trade Organization Dispute Based on Non-World Trade 
Organization Law? Questions of Jurisdiction and Merits’, 37(6) Journal of World Trade (2003) 997-1030 at 
1007. 
70
 Kwak and Marceau ‘Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction’, supra note 12 at 469. 
71
 ibid at 482. 
72
 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 165. 
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both the WTO and a PTA including a jurisdiction clause.
73
 One of these members has to 
also act inconsistently with a PTA jurisdiction clause in order for a conflict to actualise. 
Regarding the overlap ratione temporis, the conflicting norms must exist at the same time 
so that a conflict can actualise.
74
 Conflict of norms in this context arises when there is a 
jurisdiction clause in a PTA that is in force. 
The argument of different matters relates to the subject-matter, the ratio materiae 
requirement. Too strict reading of the same subject-matter requirement has been cautioned 
and considered to be unsuitable at least in situations as these under examination.
75
 Also, 
defined narrowly, a conflict arises only when a member to two treaties cannot act 
consistently with obligations arising from these different treaties.
76
 However, it is also 
possible to find a conflict in a situation where one rule prohibits a certain type of action 
that another one permits.
77
 In some circumstances the permission to act might overrule the 
prohibition to act, or the other way around. Pauwelyn concludes that there is a conflict of 
two norms if “one constitutes, has led to, or may lead to, a breach of the other” (emphasis 
original).
78
 In the same token a Study Group of the International Law Commission (ILC) 
has argued that the requirement of the same subject-matter can be said to be fulfilled if 
“two different rules or sets of rules are invoked in regard to the same matter, or if, in other 
words, as a result of interpretation, the relevant treaties seem to point to different directions 
in their application by a party”. 79  
As WTO panels have jurisdiction over legal claims founded on WTO norms and PTA 
tribunals have jurisdiction over legal claims founded on the given PTA, there is by default 
a formal difference between the matters raised in these two systems.
80
 Especially in 
situations where the PTA includes a jurisdiction clause, a substantive assessment of the 
                                                 
73
 In this context it is important to note that the WTO obligations relevant to this assessment are considered to 
be a series of bilateral obligations, and are not of erga omnes nature. See more in section 2.3.2. 
74
 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms, supra note 72 at 165. 
75
 Report of the ILC Study Group, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International law 
Commission – Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682 (Publications of the Erik Castrén Institute of 
International Law and Human Rights, University of Helsinki,  Research Reports 21/2007) (The 
Fragmentation Report) at 17, para. 21; Salles, Forum Shopping in International Adjudication, supra note 15 
at 246; Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms, supra note 72 at 171. 
76
 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms, supra note 72 at 167. 
77
 ibid at 170. 
78
 ibid at 176. 
79
 Koskenniemi, The Fragmentation Report, supra note 75 at 18, para. 23. 
80
 Salles, Forum Shopping in International Adjudication, supra note 15 at 246. 
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identity in two sets of proceedings would be more appropriate.
81
 One could also consider 
the statement made by the arbitral tribunal established under the UNCLOS in the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna case, in which the tribunal stated that “the Parties to this dispute . . . are the 
same Parties grappling not with two separate disputes but with what in fact is a single 
dispute arising under both Conventions. To find that, in this case, there is a dispute 
actually arising under UNCLOS which is distinct from the dispute that arose under the 
CCSBT would be artificial”.82 It can be concluded that at least the issue cannot be 
immediately dismissed solely on the basis of formally different law. 
A jurisdiction clause in a PTA, such as a PTA-first clause, prohibits a state that is a 
member of both agreements to bring a certain type of a case before a WTO panel. The 
DSU, on the other hand, allows, or even mandates, any member to initiate a WTO-related 
dispute in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The member raising the claim is not 
even required to be an actual exporter in order to be considered to have an interest in the 
matter and hence to be eligible to bring the case to the panel.
83
 There is a conflict between 
a prohibition to act and a permission to act. Of course the DSU norms can also be 
interpreted to mandate the panel to address an issue brought before it,
84
 creating thus a 
prohibition for non-action. In this reading, there is a prohibition conflicting with a 
prohibition, even though the subjects of the two norms are different, one addressing the 
action of a panel and the other addressing the action of a member.  
Normative conflicts can be either inherent conflicts, where one norm in itself breaches 
another norm, or conflicts in the applicable law, where the reliance on one norm leads to a 
conflict with another norm. I will now proceed to addressing the possible ways to analyse 
these conflicts. I will first discuss the hierarchy between the two systems, and then 
continue by analysing the ways of solving the conflicts of applicable law.  
 
 
 
                                                 
81
 Salles, Forum Shopping in International Adjudication, supra note 15 at 247. 
82
 Southern Bluefin Tuna, supra note 18 at 95, para. 54. 
83
 EC – Bananas, supra note 47, para. 136. 
84
 Articles 19.2 and 3.2 of the DSU state that “[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or 
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements”. This has been interpreted by some 
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2.3. The hierarchical structure of the WTO and PTAs 
2.3.1. The hierarchy of norms in public international law 
The recognised sources of international law are identified in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ).
85
 In addition to treaties and conventions, the relations 
between countries are governed by customary international law and general principles of 
law as well as by certain subsidiary sources.
86
 In addition to the sources mentioned in 
Article 38 of the ICJ statute, there are also less official and continuously emerging sources 
such as soft law.
87
 The ICJ statute does not define any normative hierarchy between the 
sources mentioned in Article 38, except for defining certain of them subsidiary, and 
therefore also secondary.
88
 
In domestic law, there is a constitution that determines the hierarchy between different 
laws and other norms. This is not the case in international law, and especially not in 
international economic law.
89
 Some authors have argued that there is no hierarchy and also 
that there cannot be any hierarchy due to the fact that all norms of international law derive 
from the will of the states.
90
 The only generally accepted norms to be higher in hierarchy 
and also to bind every country are jus cogens norms, although the question of which norms 
are just cogens is far from being solved.
91
 For all other treaty or other norms, there is no 
general hierarchical structure defining their relationship that would stem from public 
international law. For example one area of international law can be governed by a 
multilateral treaty and at the same time also on a regional or bilateral level, and the treaties 
are as a principle equivalent with each other.
92
  
                                                 
85
 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, United Nations, Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, annexed to Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco 26 June 1945, in 
force 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
86
 Article 38 of the ICJ mentions judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists 
of the various nations as subsidiary sources. 
87
 There is no generally accepted definition of soft law and there is also no consensus on its statute in 
international law. Some authors even argue that there is no soft law, but only law and non-law. However the 
ICJ has interpreted soft law in its decision. See for example Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay (Argentina vs. Uruguay) I.C.J. Reports 2010 at 14.  
88
 Dinah Shelton, ‘International Law and ‘Relative Normativity’’ in Malcom D. Evans (ed.), International 
Law (4
th
 edition, Oxford University Press: New York, 2014) 137-165 at 138. 
89
 ibid at 142–152. 
90
 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Droit International Public (4th edition, Dalloz: Paris, 1998) at 14-16. 
91
 Article 52 of the VCLT regulates the primacy of jus cogens norms. For a discussion on jus cogens and a 
hierarchy of norms see Dinah Shelton, ‘Normative Hierarchy in International Law’, 100 American Journal of 
International Law (2006) 291-323.  
92
 Shelton, ‘International Law’, supra note 88 at 138. 
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According to Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
93
, every 
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith. This article states the rule of pacta sunt servanda, which means that states must 
respect their agreements.
94
 States are usually members to several treaties at the same time, 
and all of them should be respected equally. As the WTO and PTAs are all treaty-based 
systems, it seems that they are equal sources of norms. Jurisdiction clauses included in 
PTAs bind their members as all norms in international agreements do. It has to be kept in 
mind that the members of a PTA are bound by their PTA obligations regardless of whether 
they are considered to be applicable in the WTO system or not.
95
 But because PTAs 
between WTO members are subject to the acceptance of the WTO, it has been argued the 
WTO takes precedence. The question then is, is there a hierarchy of norms between the 
two systems? I will now examine the question of the normative hierarchy between the 
WTO and PTAs; is there one and if there is, what are the effects of this hierarchy? 
2.3.2. The inherent conflict between the WTO and PTA norms 
The first type of conflict to be studied is the inherent normative conflict between the two 
systems. As the WTO is a multilateral treaty creating obligations that bind all its members, 
a PTA norm derogating from its rules is inherently in conflict with it, and hence also 
illegal.
96
 For example a free trade agreement derogating from the Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) principle is inherently in conflict with the WTO obligations. However, the WTO 
specifically accepts PTAs with certain conditions. The question is what the relationship 
between the two regimes is, and what the position of PTAs is in the WTO system.   
It has been suggested that PTAs are inter se modifications to the WTO agreements.
97
 The 
ILC has defined inter se modifications as modifications to a multilateral treaty that take 
                                                 
93
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 
331; 8 International Legal Materials (1969) 679, SopS 32 - 33/80 (VCLT). 
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 The principle has been presupposed by every treaty well before the VCLT was established, and its original 
roots are almost impossible to trace. See more in Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties, (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 1961) at 493. The importance of pacta sunt servanda in international law was confirmed by 
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Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) I.C.J. Reports 1997, para. 114. 
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obligations. See Kwak and Marceau, ‘Overlaps and conflicts of jurisdiction’, supra note 12 at 483. 
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 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms, supra note 72 at 311. It is important to note that the PTA derogating from 
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 Thomas Cottier and Marina Foltea, ‘Constitutional Functions of the WTO and Regional Trade 
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place only between certain of the members to that treaty.
98
 In the context of the WTO and 
PTAs, this means that a PTA modifies the WTO covered agreements, but only between the 
members of the PTA. In order for an inter se modification to be possible within a 
multilateral system, the obligations stemming from that agreement have to be of bilateral 
nature.
99
 This means that the obligations are not erga omnes partes, owed to all the 
members to a treaty as a whole, but a series of bilateral obligations “made” to each 
member separately. In the case of erga omnes partes obligations, inter se modifications 
would not be possible as the modifications would affect members not participating to the 
agreement. Those WTO obligations that are relevant to this discussion are considered to be 
a series of bilateral obligations.
100
  Also, inter se modifications are to be distinguished from 
treaty amendments, which revise the original treaty and bind all the members.
101
  
The possibility for treaty modifications is defined in Article 41(1) of the VCLT, which 
states that two or more of the members to a multilateral treaty may modify the treaty as 
between themselves if such modification is either explicitly allowed (Article 41(1)(a)) or 
not prohibited by the multilateral agreement (Article 41(1)(b)).
102
 Modifications can 
therefore be either explicitly permitted or prohibited by a multilateral treaty. The idea 
behind Article 41(1)(a) is that the drafters of a multilateral treaty have given the members 
an option to contract out of the agreement if they so wish.
103
 If the treaty however remains 
silent about the possibility of modifications, strict conditions stated in Article 41(1)(b) 
VCLT have to be fulfilled. Firstly, a modification is possible on the condition that it “does 
not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the 
performance of their obligations”104 and secondly, if it “does not relate to a provision, 
derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and 
                                                 
98
 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
1966 vol. II. at 235. 
99
 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms, supra note 72 at 52-53.  A different alternative would be that the obligations 
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102
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 edition, Manchester University Press: 
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purpose of the treaty as a whole”.105 According to Article 41(2) VCLT, states entering into 
inter se treaties have to notify other members of the multilateral treaty about their intention 
and of the modification, unless in a case falling under paragraph l(a) the treaty provides 
otherwise.106 
Inter se modifications bring about two different types of relations. The legal relationship 
between a state that is a member to an inter se agreement and states not members to that 
agreement remain intact and are governed solely by the multilateral treaty. The legal 
relations between states that are both members to the inter se agreement are altered by the 
agreement.
107
 The purpose of an inter se modification is not to revise the multilateral 
treaty, but is intended to modify its application in the legal relations between the members 
of the inter se treaty.
108
  The requirement set for modifications not to alter the “effective 
execution of the object and purpose” of the multilateral treaty109 means that inter se treaties 
cannot be completely in contradiction with the original treaty.  
Article 41 VCLT creates a structure that appears as a hierarchy, no matter which 
subparagraph is considered as the basis for the inter se modification. An inter se treaty is 
legal only if it is either explicitly accepted by the multilateral treaty or if it is not prohibited 
by it and fulfils the conditions set in Article 41(1)(b). If neither of these requirements is 
fulfilled, the inter se modifying treaty is illegal, even as for between the members to it.
110
 
The multilateral treaty thus determines the legality of a later treaty, and not only its own 
priority over it.
111
 In this sense, the multilateral treaty can be seen to be higher in hierarchy 
than the later modifying treaty. Article 41 can be argued to create an exception to the rule 
of contractual freedom of states.
112
 
PTAs modify the WTO covered agreements as between the members to the PTA, and are 
therefore inter se modifications in the meaning of Article 41 of the VCLT. WTO explicitly 
allows its members to enter into PTAs provided that certain conditions are met. I will now 
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 Article 41(1)(b)(ii) of the VCLT. 
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 Article 41(2) of the VCLT. 
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present these requirements set for the establishment for PTAs, and then discuss the 
structure they create for the relationship between the WTO and PTAs. 
2.3.2.1 The right of WTO members to enter into PTAs 
WTO allows its members to enter into PTAs. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)
113
 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
114
 address the issue 
somewhat differently. Article XXIV of the GATT distinguishes between customs unions 
and free trade areas, whereas Article V of the GATS addresses economic integration as a 
whole. In addition to the provisions of the GATT and the GATS, special rules have been 
granted to developing countries. The so-called enabling clause allows developed country 
members to grant differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries as 
opposed to other members on a non-reciprocal basis.
115
  These WTO provisions make it 
clear that the WTO is not indeed objecting regional integration, but that it accepts PTAs. 
The right to enter into a PTA is however conditional as PTAs must fulfil certain 
requirements set out in the GATT and in the GATS.  
Firstly, the members are required to notify the PTAs to the relevant WTO organs.
116
 The 
WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) will examine the GATT 
consistency of the PTA.
.117
 In the context of the GATS, the notification shall be made to 
the Council for Trade in Services,
118
 but it is again the CRTA that will evaluate the WTO 
consistency of the agreement.
119
 The notification about the PTA should be made 
“promptly”.120 However, the Panel in US – Line Pipe stated that even if the CRTA has not 
yet given its final decision on a matter, the PTA in question can still be found to be 
                                                 
113
 GATT 1994: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Marrakesh 15 April 1994, in force 1 January 1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, SopS 
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114
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consistent with the GATT and a member to that PTA can base its defence on Article 
XXIV.
121
  
The second condition is the prohibition to raise the level of barriers to trade for other 
members from what they were prior to the formation of the PTA.
122
 The Appellate Body 
defined this obligation in Turkey – Textiles saying that “[a] customs union should facilitate 
trade within the customs union, but it should not do so in a way that raises barriers to trade 
with third countries” (emphasis original).123 This means that PTAs are not allowed to make 
trade between members and non-members to the PTA more onerous than it was before the 
PTA was in force. Otherwise the main objective of the WTO, multilateral trade 
liberalisation, would be jeopardised. 
The last requirement is to open substantially all trade between the parties to the PTA.
124
 
This means that members to a PTA must liberalise practically all trade between them for 
the agreement to be WTO-consistent. However, the substance and coverage of the 
provisions governing these requirements in the GATT and in the GATS have not been 
fully clarified in WTO jurisprudence.
125
   
The Appellate Body has clarified in Turkey – Textiles that in order for a member to base its 
defence about a WTO-inconsistent measure on a PTA justification two requirements have 
to be fulfilled. First, the defendant must demonstrate that the PTA fully meets the 
requirements set out above. Secondly, the member must demonstrate that the formation of 
that PTA would have been prevented if it was not allowed to introduce the challenged 
measure.
126
 This is the so-called necessity test introduced by the Appellate Body in the 
context of Article XXIV. Provided that both of the requirements are fulfilled, members can 
                                                 
121
 Panel Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon 
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justify derogations from their WTO obligations on the basis of a PTA. However, what 
modifications members can base on Article XXIV justification remains unclear. 
The Appellate Body stated in Peru – Agricultural Products that the references to 
“facilitating trade” and “closer integration” found in Article XXIV.4 are not consistent 
with a reading that would offer a “broad” defence for PTA measures that “roll-back on 
Members’ rights and obligations under the WTO covered agreements”.127 This could mean 
that measures restricting trade between PTA members may not fulfil the requirements. In 
fact, the finding may significantly limit the possibilities to include WTO-minus provisions 
in PTAs.
128
  
2.3.3. Solving the inherent conflict 
The question raised here is what modifications to the WTO agreements are legal. Cottier 
and Foltea argue that the relationship between the WTO and PTAs is to be determined 
through Article 41(1)(a) of the VCLT because the GATT and the GATS specifically allow 
members to enter into PTAs. The trade relations between WTO members are lawfully 
modified only if the modifying treaty fulfils the abovementioned conditions, and therefore 
PTAs are necessarily lower in hierarchy.
129
 Cottier and Foltea argue that there is a 
constitutional hierarchy between the WTO and PTAs that stems from Article 41(1)(a) of 
the VCLT, and if a PTA is in conflict with the requirements of the GATT and the GATS, 
the PTA cedes.
130
  
Pauwelyn considers Articles XXIV of the GATT and V of the GATS as prohibitions to 
conclude PTAs that are inconsistent with the conditions set out in those articles.
131
 
Pauwelyn thus argues that the legal basis to determine the relationship between the WTO 
and PTA norms is found in Article 41(1)(b) of the VCLT. If a PTA is found to be 
inconsistent with the requirements of Articles XXIV of the GATT and V of the GATS, 
members cannot enforce the PTA, not even between themselves. This prohibition is about 
a prior treaty prohibiting certain types of inter se modifications to it, and therefore making 
such modifications illegal. In this case the WTO norms determine the obligations between 
                                                 
127
 Appellate Body Report, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, 
WT/DS457/AB/R, adopted 20 July 2015, para. 5.116 (Peru – Agricultural Products).   
128
 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Interplay between the WTO Treaty and Other International Legal Instruments and 
Tribunals: Evolution after 20 Years of WTO Jurisprudence’ (10. February 2016), available at SSRN: 
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members.
132
 If the treaty that inter se modifies the relationship between its members is 
however WTO-consistent, the WTO agreement does not prohibit it, and the norms of that 
inter se agreement determine the legal relationship between its members.
133
 According to 
Pauwelyn’s theory, there is a structure where firstly Article XXIV of the GATT and 
Article V of the GATS work as an exception that regulates the legal relationship of PTA 
members and third countries, and secondly the inter se relations of the PTA members are 
governed by Article 41(1)(b) of the VCLT.
134
 It must be kept in mind that also Article 
41(1)(b) protects third countries, as the modifications cannot nullify their rights. 
For Cottier and Foltea as well as for Pauwelyn the WTO norms are higher in hierarchy at 
the time of forming a PTA as they create the conditions which the latter have to fulfil in 
order to be legal. However, after the PTA has been accepted to be WTO consistent, this 
seems to no longer be the case. As a PTA modifies the WTO covered agreements as 
between the parties to is, the trade relations of the PTA members are governed by both 
agreements, and potentially primarily by the PTA norms.  
The difference between the two views is in the scope of the modification. If we adopt a 
strict reading of what is proposed by Cottier and Foltea, it could be argued that the 
modifications can only be made to the GATT and the GATS, as the provisions have a 
limited scope of application that does not necessarily cover other covered agreements. It 
could be argued that modifications are only allowed to be made to those agreements, as 
only those agreements are mentioned in the provisions allowing the modifications. 
However, this would mean that modifications to all other agreements are illegal. It is 
undisputed that PTAs must fulfil the requirements of Article XXIV of the GATT and V of 
the GATS to be WTO-consistent, but the position of modifications made to other 
agreements remains unclear under this interpretation. A strict reading would prohibit all 
other modifications, or at least make all modifications subject to the requirements and tests 
created for the provisions. 
Pauwelyn’s interpretation would lead to a wider application, as potentially all agreements 
and provisions could be subjected to modifications, provided that there was no prohibition 
to undertake them. Only in case such a prohibition was found would a modification be 
                                                 
132
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illegal. As Articles XXIV of the GATT and V of the GATS regulate the relationship 
between PTA members and third countries, they do not affect the inter se relations of PTA 
members. Also, even if those provisions were to be considered as applicable between PTA 
members, they do not regulate modifications made to other covered agreements, meaning 
that such modifications are covered by Article 41(1)(b) of the VCLT.
135
 The difference 
between the views is mainly whether Articles XXIV of the GATT and V of the GATS and 
the tests established under those provisions regulate the WTO-consistency of the PTA in 
general or whether each and every modification must fulfil their requirements. 
In Peru – Agricultural Products the Appellate Body addressed the WTO compatibility of 
inter se modifications in a PTA, stating that their legality is not to be analysed through 
Article 41 of the VCLT, but the findings are to be based on Articles XXIV of the GATT, V 
of the GATS and the enabling clause.
136
 The Appellate Body also reminded that the 
purpose of PTAs is to further liberalise trade between the members, not to create additional 
restrictions to their WTO rights and obligations.
137
 While it is clear that the assessment of 
the legality of PTAs is based on the relevant WTO provisions, I do not consider that this 
limits the applicability of Article 41 of the VCLT when analysing inter se modifications. 
The reading of the Appellate Body seems to explicitly follow the route of Article 41(1)(a), 
as it states that a modification is to be analysed on the basis of the criteria developed for 
Article XXIV justification. However, based on this analysis, it could be understood that 
only such modifications that are specifically allowed by the covered agreements are 
accepted, and therefore that the position suggested by Cottier and Foltea is to be followed.  
The Peru – Agricultural Products report leaves a few questions unanswered. Articles 
XXIV of the GATT and V of the GATS only refer to “this agreement”, which leaves the 
question of inter se modifications made in other covered agreements unclear. It could be 
argued that those provisions only set a general framework for PTAs, and provided that the 
conditions are fulfilled, inter se modifications to agreements other than the GATT and the 
GATS are legal as long as they are not prohibited in the texts of other covered agreements 
and do not affect the rights of third parties. However, even though the analysis in Peru – 
Agricultural Products was made in relation to the Agreement on Agriculture, the Appellate 
Body considered that the analysis was to be based on Article XXIV of the GATT. This 
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raises the question whether all modifications need to also fulfil the requirements developed 
for Article XXIV justification, mainly the necessity test created in Turkey – Textiles. 
If the statement of the Appellate Body is considered to mean that all PTA measures 
derogating from the WTO covered agreements are to be analysed through the necessity test 
established in Turkey – Textiles, it is likely that no WTO-minus obligations would ever be 
found legal. It is difficult to imagine how any limitation would be considered to be so 
fundamental that in the absence of that measure the formation of the PTA would have been 
prevented. For example it is likely that modifications to the DSU would not be found to 
fulfil the test. Following Pauwelyn’s argumentation, the test in Turkey – Textiles only 
applies to measures affecting the rights of third parties and not to the inter se relations of 
PTA members. However, this does not seem to be the interpretation of the Appellate Body 
based on its analysis in Peru – Agricultural Products.  
In any case, the reasoning of the Appellate Body still leaves open the question whether 
modifications to other covered agreements are to be analysed through Article XXIV or 
whether modifications in cases that do not fall in its scope are governed by Article 41(1)(b) 
of the VCLT. Pauwelyn has noted that if the statement made by the Appellate Body in 
Peru – Agricultural Products meant that no modifications except for those falling in the 
scope of Articles XXIV of the GATT and V of the GATS were allowed, it would 
effectively put the WTO covered agreements above all other international agreements.
138
 It 
is true that in case all inter se modifications were analysed through Article XXIV, 
members would have very limited scope to undertake WTO-inconsistent measures even if 
they did not have any effects on third parties. 
As Article XXIV of the GATT and V of the GATS have only a limited scope, 
modifications to other covered agreements ought to be analysed through Article 41(1)(b) of 
the VCLT.
139
 If this view is accepted, modifications to the other covered agreements would 
be allowed if there is no prohibition to undertake them, the rights of third parties would not 
be affected and it is not found to be incompatible with the effective execution of the object 
and purpose of the agreement in question as a whole.  
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If we find that a PTA fulfils the conditions set out in Articles XXIV of the GATT and V of 
the GATS, the inherent normative conflict is avoided and there is no overall primacy of 
WTO norms, meaning that PTA norms are both legal and bind the members of the PTA. 
Whether the test for PTAs applies to all individual PTA norms depends on the reading of 
the Appellate Body’s findings in Peru – Agricultural Products. I would suggest that norms 
that fall outside the scope of Article XXIV of the GATT and V of the GATS are subject to 
the rules of Article 41(1)(b) of the VCLT. If the requirements of the VCLT are fulfilled, 
the provisions are legal. Different question then is whether such modifications can be taken 
into consideration in the WTO dispute settlement system, regardless of their validity and 
legality between the parties.  
The next problem arises with the effectiveness of such modification. In order for such inter 
se modifications to be taken into consideration in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings, 
the panel would have to apply the PTA norm or interpret the relevant WTO norm in the 
light of the PTA provision. The Appellate Body has stated that such interpretations based 
on subsequent agreements that would completely diminish the “common intention” of the 
WTO parties are not supported by the general rules of treaty interpretation of Article 31 of 
the VCLT.
140
 With regard to derogations from clear WTO norms the possibility to solve 
the conflict by using the PTA norms as tools for interpretation seems unlikely. For 
example in relation to the DSU there is practically no room for interpretation in the 
relevant norms. This might not however be the case in the context of using jurisdiction 
clauses as a means of interpretation when basing a claim on a procedural principle, such as 
estoppel or procedural good faith. I will address these issues separately in section 3. 
The issue of the effects of PTAs as inter se modifications to the WTO agreements 
essentially boils down to the question of applicable law in the WTO system. Many scholars 
are of the view that such changes to the WTO agreements that are meant to bind the WTO 
tribunals should be done through the amendment process.
141
 This would make the changes 
applicable to all members. Following this logic, even if PTA members can legally inter se 
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modify their rights and obligations, these modifications are not applicable in the WTO 
dispute settlement.
142
 
The issue of applicable law in the WTO is one of the most controversial issues of the WTO 
norms system. The approaches taken in this regard are quite opposite and lead to different 
conclusions. One end accepts the applicability of these jurisdiction norms and solves the 
problem by applying conflict rules, while the other end stresses the specific nature of the 
WTO and excludes the possibility of applying PTA jurisdiction norms in the WTO system 
completely. I will now move on to addressing the issue of conflicts of applicable law in the 
WTO. 
2.4. Conflicts of applicable law and how to solve them 
After the issue of inherent conflict has been resolved, the focus turns to the conflict of the 
applicable law. In order for a jurisdiction clause included in a PTA to affect the jurisdiction 
of the WTO, the panel has to take it into account when deciding upon its own jurisdiction. 
The panel has to therefore either apply the norm or apply a relevant WTO norm in the light 
of that jurisdiction clause, in other words use it as a means of interpretation. The 
assessment of the effects of jurisdiction clauses included in PTAs has to therefore begin 
from the question of the sources of law in the WTO system. Can non-WTO norms be taken 
into consideration when assessing the jurisdiction of the WTO in a certain matter? As 
PTAs are not WTO law, the answer to their applicability is far from clear. In fact the 
question of whether non-WTO agreements can be used as a source of law in the WTO is an 
extremely controversial issue.
143
 
The WTO covered agreements do not state any conflict rules for the possible situations of 
conflict of norms. There is no clear guidance as to how the relationship between the WTO 
and PTA norms is to be settled, as the covered agreements merely state that members are 
entitled to enter into such agreements. The conditions set out for PTAs do not clarify the 
issue ether. Are there any norms in the covered agreements that could be interpreted to 
either allow or prohibit the application of a jurisdiction clause excluding the jurisdiction of 
the WTO? Can jurisdiction clauses included in PTAs exclude the jurisdiction of the WTO? 
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In this section, I will fist present the status of the WTO as a special regime of international 
law. I will then analyse the applicability of non-WTO norms in the WTO system, and the 
conclusions drawn from this discussion to the issues of conflicting PTA jurisdiction 
clauses. Lastly I shall present the conflict rules created to solve normative conflicts in 
public international law.  
2.4.1. The WTO – A self-contained or merely a special regime? 
International trade law has always been considered to exist somewhat outside the 
mainstream of international law.
144
 Also the WTO is often referred to as a self-contained 
regime, or at least as a specific subsystem of international law.
145
 The concept of a 
self-contained regime was first established by the Permanent Court of International Justice 
in the S.S. Wimbledon case, where the Court had to decide whether the status of the Kiel 
Canal should be analysed though general law on international waterways or through 
special rules of the Treaty of Versailles. In that case, the Court established that the 
provisions of the Treaty of Versailles were substantially different from other rules 
regulating international watercourses and were therefore self-contained.
146
 The concept 
was further developed by the ICJ in the Teheran Hostages case, where the court stated that 
the rules of international diplomatic law create a self-contained regime, meaning that they 
provide the necessary means of defence and sanctions, and exclude the use of the general 
rules of state responsibility.
147
 The idea of self-contained regimes has been applied also in 
the Nicaragua case in the context of human rights treaties, although the ICJ did not 
specifically refer to the concept as such.
148
 
The notion of self-contained regime constitutes a strong form of lex specialis, and it is 
generally used to refer to the exclusion of the application of general rules on state 
responsibility.
149
 The Commentary of Article 55 of the ILC Draft Articles on the 
responsibilities of States for internationally wrongful acts also refers to “strong” forms of 
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lex specialis in the context of self-contained regime.
150
 After the ICJ report in the Teheran 
Hostages case, the concept has been applied in the context of secondary, not primary 
rules.
151
 The term has been said to refer to “a particular category of subsystems, namely 
those that embrace a full, exhaustive and definitive, set of secondary rules.”152  
The mandatory nature of the WTO’s dispute settlement system is governed by Article 23 
of the DSU, which excludes the members’ possibilities to “make a determination to the 
effect that a violation has occurred”153 or to undertake unilateral countermeasures against 
another member without having initiated the WTO dispute settlement system.
154
 All 
WTO-related conflicts are to be settled in the WTO system, and all measures taken outside 
its dispute settlement mechanism are forbidden. Even though the question of whether 
general rules of state responsibility could still be applied in the WTO context is not 
completely clear,
155
 it is safe to say that at least in this narrow reading of the term, the 
WTO is a self-contained regime. 
The concept of self-contained regime is however also used more broadly than merely to 
exclude the general rules of state responsibility. It is often used to refer to whole fields of 
specialised legal systems, to explain the use of specialised rules and techniques of 
interpretation.
156
 This is also the case in the context of the WTO. For example Gabrielle 
Marceau defines the WTO as a “specific subsystem on international law with specific 
rights and obligations, specific claims and causes of action, specific violations, specific 
enforcement mechanisms and specific remedies in case of their violation”.157 A very strict 
reading of a self-contained regime does not allow sources of law other than those created 
within its own system to be applied.
158
 This specific nature of the WTO and its alleged 
autonomy are often argued to exclude the application of non-WTO law in the WTO legal 
system. Pauwelyn has cautioned not to give too much emphasis on the self-contained or 
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special nature of the WTO, as it is one thing to be self-contained in terms of state 
responsibility, and a whole other thing to be self-contained in terms of other aspects of 
international law, such as the law of treaties or the judicial settlement of disputes.
159
 
It is important to note that self-contained or special regimes do not exist in complete 
isolation from public international law, as has been accepted also by the Appellate Body.
160
 
Therefore, even the WTO cannot be considered as a closed system.
161
 The WTO treaty was 
created and now exists in the “wider body of international law”.162 Self-contained regimes 
are therefore not to be seen as fully autonomous subsystems existing outside the reach of 
public international law.
163
 The WTO panels and the Appellate Body have on several 
occasions applied the rules of general international law in their decision making process.
164
 
The interpretative effect of public international law is rather clearly stated in the DSU, as 
Article 3.2 of the DSU states that WTO rules are to be clarified in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. The panel has gone as far as 
to say that customary international law applies in the WTO to the extent that the WTO 
agreements do not “contract out” from it.165  
As a special regime of international law, the WTO does not have to justify the 
non-application of general international law in every turn, and it can operate on the basis of 
the special rules created in the covered agreements.
166
 It operates as a lex specialis with its 
own sanction mechanism. The effects of this “speciality” are however unclear and the 
direct applicability of non-WTO law remains disputed. It has been argued that on the basis 
of the WTO existing in the sphere of international law, the rules of public international law 
would apply in its functions, at least to the extent that the WTO has not contracted out 
from it.
167
 The liberal side on the applicability of non-WTO law views the WTO as merely 
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a branch of the “wider corpus of international law.”168 On the other hand, the opposing side 
considers the panel’s mandate to be limited to applying only WTO law, and underlines the 
fact that the WTO is a specific, and also self-contained, system of international law. But 
what are the sources of law in the WTO? 
2.4.2. The sources of law in the WTO legal system – Opposing approaches and 
conflicting conclusions 
As stated in section 2.3.1., the formal sources of international law are identified in Article 
38 of the Statute of the ICJ. The sources include international conventions, custom and 
general principles of law as well as judicial decisions and teachings of highly qualified 
publicists. However, not all international tribunals apply the same law and sources, and as 
was noted in the context of specific subsystems, the level of application of general 
international law is a regime-specific issue as a regime may decide to contract out of 
certain aspects of it.
169
  
There is no list of sources of law equivalent to Art 38 of the ICJ statute in the WTO 
covered agreements, and therefore the question of applicable law in the WTO has raised a 
significant amount of academic discussion. It has been suggested that some guidance as to 
the sources of law can be found in Articles 3.2 and 7 of the DSU.
170
 Article 3.2 states that 
the WTO dispute settlement system serves to clarify the provisions of the covered 
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international 
law. Article 7 refers to the covered agreements in defining the panel’s terms of reference. 
Article 7.2 of the DSU also states that “[p]anels shall address the relevant provisions in any 
covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute.” Palmeter and 
Mavroidis have interpreted these provisions as a substitute for Article 38 of the ICJ statue, 
and in practice incorporate the same content to the WTO system.
171
 However this view has 
not been widely accepted.
172
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The fundamental sources of law in the WTO are the WTO legal texts, the covered 
agreements.
173
 Art. 1.1 of the DSU states that “[t]he rules and procedures of this 
Understanding shall apply to disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute 
settlement provisions of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this Understanding”. 
Therefore only those agreements listed in Appendix 1 of the DSU are WTO covered 
agreements.
174
 The jurisdiction of the panels is clearly limited to deciding on claims under 
the covered agreements. It could be easily concluded from this that the applicable law 
before the panel is found solely in the covered agreements.
175
 Jurisdiction of the WTO and 
the scope of the applicable law before the panel are however two separate issues that have 
to be distinguished from one another.
176
  
The problems arise when the panel is requested to take into consideration non-WTO law. 
As presented above, the WTO is a specific subsystem of international law that creates its 
own obligations and rights. The WTO is therefore mainly interested in the content of its 
own “special” law.177 As these rights and obligations however overlap with other norms of 
international law, as is the case with PTA jurisdiction clauses, the extent of this specific 
nature of the WTO has to be studied in order to find out how much relevance can be given 
to norms created outside the WTO system. The Appellate Body has stated that the WTO 
agreements are not to be read in clinical isolation of public international law.
178
 The 
question is, how far we can go with non-WTO law. 
The “universalists” and “particularists”179 have taken very different approaches on the 
applicability of non-WTO law, and somewhat heated discussion on this topic has taken 
place over the years. The restrictive camp views that the mandate of the WTO tribunals is 
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clear: they can only apply WTO law.
180
 WTO panels and the Appellate Body are not 
entitled to directly apply other than substantive WTO law.
181
 This approach is mostly 
based on the wording of the DSU. The mandate of the panel and its possibilities to take 
non-WTO law into consideration is argued to be limited due to Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the 
DSU. Article 3.2 DSU states that “[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add 
to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.” The same is 
repeated in Article 19.2 DSU which states that “[i]n accordance with paragraph 2 of 
Article 3, in their findings and recommendations, the panel and Appellate Body cannot add 
to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.” 
According to this view, the prohibition to add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided by the covered agreements is seen as specifically significant. As the 
recommendations and rulings of the panel cannot add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided by the covered agreements,
182
 and the terms of reference of the panel 
can only consist of WTO law,
183
 and as the function of the panel is to assess the 
applicability of and conformity of the measure with the relevant covered agreements,
184
 it 
would be “absurd” to suggest that non-WTO law could be applied.185 The application of 
non-WTO rules would always lead to adding or diminishing the rights or obligations of 
members, and therefore the panels and the Appellate Body do not have the mandate to 
apply such norms.
186
 As WTO panels or the Appellate Body cannot apply or enforce other 
treaties, these may only be examined when interpreting WTO law.
187
 The supporters of this 
approach note also that had the members wished to grant a broader scope of applicable law 
in the WTO system, it would have been stated more clearly in the text of the DSU.
188
 
Another approach suggests that all international law could be applied in the WTO, but in 
case there is an inconsistency between a WTO norm and a non-WTO norm, the former 
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applies and the latter cedes.
189
 Bartels argues that the prohibition to add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations leads to a certain priority of WTO norms. The requirement of not to 
add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided by the covered agreements thus 
works as a limitation on the applicability of non-WTO norms in WTO dispute settlement. 
According to this approach, Articles 3.2 and 19.2 provide a rule that acts as a conflict 
rule.
190
 Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis seem to agree with this approach. Their 
view is that in case there is a conflict between a WTO norm and a non-WTO norm, the 
panel has to adhere to the WTO norm and reject any rule that is conflicting with it, 
supporting this approach by the prohibition to add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the WTO agreements.
191
 The DSU does not restrict the possible sources of 
international law that could be applied in the dispute, but it does nevertheless create 
boundaries on the use of non-WTO law in dispute settlement.
192
 
The liberal camp is of completely different view and specifically underlines the status of 
the WTO as a branch of international law, not giving too much emphasis on its self-
contained nature.
193
 Even without the explicit reference of Art 3.2 of the DSU to customary 
international law on treaty interpretation, those rules would have applied to the WTO 
treaty.
194
 Attention is drawn to the fact that even though states can in their treaty relations 
contract out of certain or even all rules of international law,
195
 they cannot contract out of 
the whole system of public international law.
196
 The establishment of treaty relations 
happens automatically within the system of international law.
197
 The issue of applicable 
law, from this point of view, boils down to the question of how much has the WTO 
contracted out of international law.
198
 This contracting out may be explicitly stated in the 
text of the treaty, but it may also be implicit, and evidenced through treaty interpretation.
199
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The liberal approach accepts the use of non-WTO law if it is applicable law between the 
parties, meaning that it binds both of the parties and is both valid and legal, and if it 
prevails over the conflicting WTO norm.
200
 The fact that the jurisdiction of the panel is 
limited to claims under the covered agreements does not mean that the WTO agreements 
are the only applicable law available for them.
201
 Non-WTO law is to be applied if it is 
relevant to the dispute and binds the parties, and the conflicts between the non-WTO 
norms and the WTO norms are to be resolved through conflict rules of international law.
202
 
As the WTO has not contracted out of the general rules of lex posterior, lex specialis or 
inter se modifications, these rules apply in the WTO system and have to be considered in 
the dispute settlement.
203
 This approach has also been backed up by previous WTO 
jurisprudence. The panels and the Appellate Body have applied non-WTO rules in their 
jurisprudence, most often to fill the gaps left open by the covered agreements.
204
 They have 
for example applied rules on burden of proof
205
, the right to use private counsel
206
, la 
compétence de la compétence
207
 and non-retroactivity of treaties
208
 which do not derive 
from the WTO covered agreements.  
Perhaps the most prominent argument against the possibility to accept all international law 
as potentially applicable in the WTO system is that the WTO panels do not have the 
mandate to enforce non-WTO rules.
209
 However, the enforceability of non-WTO rules is 
not at issue here. The limited jurisdiction of the WTO is undisputed; panels can only 
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decide upon disputes regarding the covered agreements and their jurisdiction is therefore 
limited to deciding on whether or not a WTO obligation has been breached.
210
 But when 
deciding whether a provision of a covered agreement has been breached, or in this case 
deciding whether the panel has jurisdiction to hear the matter, non-WTO law can create a 
legitimate defence, affecting the outcome of the panel’s decision.211 Koskenniemi has also 
stated that there is no provision in the WTO defining the scope of applicable law and that 
“[a] limited jurisdiction does not, however, imply a limitation of the scope of the law 
applicable in the interpretation and application of those treaties”.212 Gao and Lim have 
clarified this difference by explaining that jurisdiction deals with the basis of a claim in a 
dispute, while the question of applicable law is concerned with the arguments that can be 
used to support the claim.
213
 Limitation to the jurisdiction of the WTO tribunals is not the 
same thing as the applicable law in a dispute.
214
  
The panel can never make a finding about a breach of a norm in another treaty, but 
according to this approach, it has to assess whether there is a non-WTO norm overruling a 
WTO norm that affects the matter at hand. Stating that a breach of a WTO norm is 
justifiable based on a non-WTO norm is not enforcing the non-WTO norm; it is merely 
stating that the WTO breach is acceptable. Also, finding that a non-WTO jurisdiction norm 
overrules the jurisdiction of the DSU based on the lex specialis or lex posterior rules is 
merely stating that the DSU norm is overruled, and therefore not applicable.  
2.4.2.1. The direct applicability of PTA jurisdiction clauses  
How does the discussion on applicable law reflect to the issue of jurisdiction norms 
included in PTAs and their effects on the WTO’s jurisdiction? As already stated, there are 
no clear provisions in the WTO covered agreements that would determine the relationship 
between WTO and PTA norms. The applicability of jurisdiction clauses included in PTAs 
is extremely controversial and has been analysed from different perspectives. PTAs are not 
listed in Appendix 1 of the DSU, and hence are not WTO law, even though they are 
explicitly allowed and governed by the WTO covered agreements. Could the DSU Articles 
on the jurisdiction of the WTO and the prohibition to add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided by the covered agreements be seen as a limitation to effective 
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modifications of the agreements? The question here is can the panel take the valid and 
legal PTA jurisdiction clause in the consideration. 
The WTO member states’ right to initiate a dispute in the WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings is stated in Art 23.1 of the DSU, which reads as follows: “[w]hen Members 
seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of 
benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective 
of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and 
procedures of this Understanding.” Does the prohibition to diminish the rights provided by 
Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU mean that the members’ rights to have their case heard in 
the WTO dispute settlement cannot be excluded, even if there is a rule binding the parties 
to the dispute restricting the panel’s jurisdiction on the matter? If this was the case, it 
would mean that the PTA cannot modify the WTO’s jurisdiction in a truly effective way in 
the inter se relations between the parties. The right to initiate the dispute settlement in the 
WTO would remain untouched notwithstanding the PTA norm stating the opposite. 
Jurisdiction norms are effective as modifications only if norms other than those stemming 
from the covered agreements are taken into consideration in WTO dispute settlement. This 
would require the WTO to acknowledge the inter se modifications made by the members 
and also to allow them to affect its own functions. If, however, the WTO considers that it is 
a completely separate system and that norms stemming from other treaties cannot be 
applied, jurisdiction clauses could not overrule the jurisdiction of the WTO since such 
norms would be disregarded in the WTO context. The different approaches on the 
applicable law in the WTO system naturally lead to different conclusions on this matter. 
The simplest conclusion comes from the restrictive camp. If non-WTO law cannot be 
applied, jurisdiction clauses in PTAs cannot be applied either. Special consideration is 
given to the wording of the DSU, especially to the prohibition stated in Articles 3.2 and 
19.2.
215
 Trachtman argues that the wording of the relevant DSU articles would be absurd if 
they could be overruled.
216
 Marceau and Kwak consider Article 23 of the DSU to be a 
statement of compulsory and mandatory jurisdiction. If a member considers that its WTO 
rights are affected by a measure taken by another member, it has the right to initiate a 
dispute in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, regardless of any non-WTO norm 
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stating otherwise.
217
 The panel thus has no right not to address the issue if a case is brought 
before it, even if there was a jurisdiction clause in another inter se treaty excluding its 
jurisdiction. This would diminish the members’ right to initiate a dispute in the WTO 
dispute settlement system. Article 23 of the DSU provides a mandatory jurisdiction that a 
PTA cannot overrule, and thus such inter se modifications affecting its jurisdiction are not 
valid from the point of view of the WTO.
218
 
Following the logic of the “middle-approach”, even if the parties to the dispute had agreed 
upon a valid jurisdiction clause, it could not affect the panel’s jurisdiction. As Article 23 of 
the DSU offers all WTO members the right to access the dispute settlement of the WTO 
when they consider that their WTO rights have been nullified or impaired, a jurisdiction 
clause in a PTA could not be applied, as it would be in conflict with Article 23 and 
therefore it would diminish the dispute settlement rights granted by the WTO.
219
 A 
jurisdiction clause cannot exclude the WTO’s jurisdiction if one of the members to a PTA 
decided to trigger the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The norm would not bind the 
panel as it cannot be applied, even if it was legal and binds the parties.  
The liberal approach views nothing in the WTO covered agreements that would limit the 
members’ possibilities to include an effective jurisdiction clause in a PTA. This means that 
the WTO might have to decline jurisdiction in a situation where the conflict rules lead to a 
PTA norm to be the prevailing norm in a specific situation. Pauwelyn argues that Arts 3.2 
and 19.2 of the DSU do not proclaim that WTO law should always prevail or that the panel 
has jurisdiction in each and every case brought before it. Not only do they not have an 
effect on the jurisdiction of the panel but they also do not affect the applicable law before 
the panel.
220
 The prohibition to add to or diminish the parties’ WTO rights and obligations 
is not relevant here, since the parties have both agreed to these non-WTO norms that have 
to be applied.
221
 In his view these articles serve as an interpretative tool for the panels and 
for the Appellate Body when interpreting the covered agreements. The panels and the 
Appellate Body “may not create new rights and obligations, they must apply those that 
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WTO members agreed to.”222 This does not mean that the members cannot decide to inter 
se agree that the provisions do not apply as for between themselves.  
The different approaches thus lead to completely different conclusions. There are two 
alternative conclusions to the issue. If the inter se nature of PTA jurisdiction clauses and 
their applicability is accepted in the WTO system, it leads to the possible exclusion of the 
WTO’s jurisdiction in certain matters. The conflict of norms between the WTO and PTAs 
should in this scenario be resolved through determining which norms are applicable in a 
given situation, and this would be done by applying the conflict rules of international 
law.
223
 For this to happen, the WTO panel would have to accept the applicability of the 
PTA jurisdiction norm in the relations between the parties. If, however, the applicability of 
PTA jurisdiction clauses is not accepted in the WTO due to them being non-WTO law or 
because of the mandatory nature of the WTO’s jurisdiction, then the conflict of 
jurisdictions cannot be solved at a normative level. The normative conflict would remain 
irrelevant form the point of view of the WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 
It seems impossible to find a definite answer to the question of direct applicability of PTA 
jurisdiction clauses in the WTO system under the current state of law. Going back to the 
inter se modifications addressed in section 2.3.3, article 41 of the VCLT offered two 
alternative requirements under which a treaty could be modified; first if the modification is 
specifically accepted by the original treaty (Article 41(1)(a)) or secondly if the 
modification is not prohibited by the original treaty (Article 41(1)(b)). As I have noted, 
PTAs are specifically accepted by the WTO and members are entitled to modify their 
WTO obligations with these agreements, even though they are in conflict with the WTO 
provisions. The biggest issue is that, whereas the GATT and the GATS offer specific 
provisions for modifications, the DSU remains silent on this possibility, and even includes 
a provision prohibiting the panels from adding or diminishing rights provided in the 
covered agreements. The question therefore is, can the panel take the modification into 
consideration regardless of the limitations in Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU. 
There seems to be nothing in the covered agreements that would suggest that members 
cannot restrict trade between themselves by establishing a PTA., with the exception of the 
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requirement to open substantially all trade between the PTA members.
224
 The only 
possibility could arise from Article 23 DSU, and if it is indeed considered to establish such 
a limitation, it means that the PTA jurisdiction clauses are illegal the same way that PTAs 
not fulfilling the requirements set in GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V are illegal. 
However, it seems unlikely that a provision granting a right to a member would create a 
prohibition to that member to depart from it. At most it could act as a prohibition for panels 
when read together with Article 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU, as argued by Trachtmann and 
Marceau. Following the reasoning of Pauwelyn, even this interpretation does not limit the 
applicability of the PTA norm, since the members have themselves agreed to give up their 
rights under Article 23. 
When a WTO member bases its justification about a deviation from the MFN principle on 
a PTA, the panel is obliged to accept the measure that would otherwise be considered as a 
breach of that member’s WTO obligations.225 If the PTA defence is accepted, it factually 
means that the obligations of that PTA member are different towards other PTA members 
and non-members, and that its WTO obligations have been modified. For example the 
MFN principle is not applicable under those circumstances. For example for the question 
of necessity of the measure to the formation of the PTA, the panel must look at the 
measure, meaning the PTA provision. Based on this provision, the panel then accepts that 
it overrules the WTO norm. Could this “setting aside” of a WTO provision apply in the 
context of jurisdiction clauses as well? If this was be accepted, the defendant could base its 
argument of the non-application of Article 23 of the DSU on a PTA modification the same 
way it can now justify its deviation from substantial WTO obligations on a modification, 
and claim that regardless of DSU articles, the panel does not have jurisdiction or at least 
that it should not exercise its jurisdiction
226
 due to a jurisdiction clause.  
Salles suggests that Articles XXIV of the GATT and V of the GATS should be accepted to 
mandate recognition of both substantive and procedural norms included in PTAs.
227
 This 
would lead to PTA jurisdiction clauses being applicable the same way as substantive PTA 
norms excluding the MFN or other WTO rights towards non-PTA members, or even 
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derogations from WTO obligations towards PTA members in the form of retaliation basing 
on PTA norms are accepted.
228
 This means that if the PTA which jurisdiction clause is 
invoked is WTO-consistent, all its norms can potentially override WTO norms as between 
the members of the agreement, including the procedural jurisdiction norm excluding the 
jurisdiction of the WTO. Salles also suggests a second route, through which PTA 
jurisdiction clauses can overrule the jurisdiction of the WTO because Article 23 of the 
DSU can be inter se modified, meaning that its modification has not been prohibited by the 
covered agreements.  
Both of these views are in line with the argumentation explained in section 2.3.3 in relation 
to inter se modifications. In my opinion the only difference between the two approaches 
Salles suggests is the VCLT article applied. The first suggestion, even if he does not 
explicitly spell it out, bases on Art 41(1)(a) of the VCLT and the fact that the GATT and 
the GATS specifically accept inter se modifications. The second suggestion takes the route 
of the VCLT 41(1)(b) and argues that as it is not prohibited to inter se modify Article 23 of 
the DSU, it can indeed be done, and based on this the DSU Article cannot prevent the 
application of the PTA jurisdiction clause.  
A counterargument for the first approach supported by Salles to accept the applicability of 
PTA jurisdiction norms based on application of Article 41(1)(a) of the VCLT can be found 
from the texts of the WTO agreements. The wording of Articles XXIV of the GATT and V  
of the GATS might create restrictions on their applicability in regard of other WTO 
agreements, as they state that “[t]his Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from 
being a party to or entering into an agreement liberalizing trade in services between or 
among the parties to such an agreement, provided that such an agreement”229 and “the 
provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent . . . the formation of a customs union or of a 
free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a 
customs union or of a free-trade area” (emphasis added).230 These articles thus specifically 
refer to the provisions of those agreements and not to all of the covered agreements. The 
jurisdiction of the WTO is established by the DSU, to which the modification is to be made 
in order to exclude the jurisdiction of the WTO. Another aspect to be considered in the 
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context of Article 41(1)(a) is the necessity-test created for Article XXIV of the GATT in 
Turkey – Textiles. If the test was applied in the context of DSU modifications, it is unlikely 
that the provision would be justified under Article XXIV. 
The fact is that PTAs are specifically allowed, and the question of whether Articles XXIV 
of the GATT and V of the GATS offer exemptions to other WTO rules than the MFN 
principle is still controversial.
231
 The WTO agreement is a single undertaking
232
 and 
therefore all rules are to be followed simultaneously unless there is a conflict between 
them. As Salles has noted, “it would be very awkward if developments under a permitted 
preferential agreement . . . were suddenly prohibited by or blocked at the WTO”.233 If a 
PTA is WTO-compatible, the trade relations of PTA members are governed by the PTA 
and not solely by the WTO. If the necessary conditions are fulfilled, the deviation from 
WTO norms is explicitly accepted. The question is whether the panel would allow such 
deviation from WTO norms to extent to the DSU provisions concerning its jurisdiction and 
not just substance GATT and GATS norms.  
The argument based on the application of Article 41(1)(b) of the VCLT offers an easier 
route as modifications to the DSU are not prohibited. It can indeed be argued that as this 
relationship between the WTO and PTAs is not further clarified in the covered agreements, 
members can inter se modify any rules they wish to, as long as it does not affect other 
members. It seems logical to think that as WTO members have agreed to explicitly allow 
PTAs and because they have also agreed to limit the powers of the WTO as for between 
themselves by these PTAs, often with a fork-in-the-road or other type of jurisdiction 
provisions, that these agreements would also be effective in the WTO system. These 
conflicts can only arise between WTO members that are both members to an agreement 
including a jurisdiction clause. If WTO members would want PTAs to be subordinate to 
WTO norms in every situation, this position could easily be stated in the relevant WTO 
provisions. 
Indeed the possibilities of members to contract out from their procedural rights have been 
accepted in the past. The possibility to waive the rights arising from the DSU was 
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addressed in EC – Bananas III (2nd Recourse to Art. 21.5).234 In that case the question was 
whether a member could waive its rights to have recourse to the DSU Article 21.5 
procedures. In this context the Appellate Body stated that “there must be a clear indication 
in the agreement between the parties of a relinquishment of the right to have recourse to 
Article 21.5.”235 The Appellate Body noted that it cannot be “lightly assumed” that a 
member would have waived its rights under the DSU, and that such finding could only be 
made when there is an explicit agreement to waive to have recourse to the DSU 21.5 
procedures.
236
  
The question in EC – Bananas III (2nd Recourse to Art. 21.5) is obviously not identical to 
the question of jurisdictional conflicts, but it can be argued that it is indeed possible to 
waive and modify permanently the rights arising from the DSU so that it is also recognised 
in WTO dispute settlement. Even though such possibility is clearly interpreted narrowly, in 
the context of PTA jurisdiction clauses there is an explicit agreement to waive the 
members’ DSU rights. Therefore, if this right is available to other provisions of the DSU, 
such as Article 23, even these strict requirements can easily be argued to be fulfilled. This 
suggests that the route of Article 41(1)(b) might allow members to contract out and to 
modify more permanently their rights arising from Article 23 of the DSU by a jurisdiction 
clause. In the light of EC – Bananas III (2nd Recourse to Art. 21.5), it can be argued that 
the panel does indeed also have the power to take such modifications into consideration 
regardless of the limitations in Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU. As the PTA members 
have explicitly agreed to contract out of Article 23 of the DSU, there is no prohibition in 
the DSU for modifications, and these modifications do not affect the rights of third parties, 
it seems logical to assume that provisions in the DSU addressing the rights of the panel 
cannot nullify these modifications. Following this logic, the whole issue of applicable law 
should not render legal modifications ineffective, but the panel should take the jurisdiction 
clause in a PTA into consideration when considering its ability to hear the case. 
Whilst it may be difficult for WTO tribunals to accept deviation from WTO norms or 
jurisdiction on the basis of issues such as environmental law or human rights, this should 
not be the case in the context of PTA jurisdiction and norms. PTAs have a special standing 
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in the WTO system, and the WTO specifically accepts deviations from WTO norms based 
on PTA norms. PTAs are express inter se modifications to WTO rules and the purpose of 
these agreements is to contract out of the obligations established in the WTO system. Of 
course, the main purpose is to give preference to the other PTA members, but if the 
members wish to also create more stringent rules, as is the case with jurisdiction clauses 
regulating the possibilities to initiate a dispute in the WTO system, should this not be 
accepted the same way as the provisions aiming to open trade are accepted? In my opinion, 
the special standing of PTAs in the WTO system should be taken into consideration when 
the panel assesses its jurisdiction in a matter brought before it. However, so far the WTO 
tribunals have not assessed normative conflicts between WTO and PTA norms any 
differently than conflicts between WTO and other non-WTO norms.
237
  
2.4.3. Conflict rules of international law 
Conflict rules of international law provide a method of interpreting the legislative 
intention.
238
 If a PTA is found to be legal and valid in the light of Articles XXIV of the 
GATT and V of the GATS, it fulfils the conditions of Article 41(1)(b) of the VCLT, and 
the applicability of PTA norms is accepted, the conflicts between them and the WTO 
norms are to be solved through the conflict rules of international law. The conflict is to be 
solved by finding one norm that expresses the most “closest, detailed, precise or strongest” 
expression of the intention and will of the states.
239
 This analysis is obviously only relevant 
if the panel takes these jurisdiction clauses into consideration in the first place.  
I will now briefly introduce the conflict rules that are relevant in assessing which norm is 
to be applied in a given situation in case the PTA rule is accepted as applicable law. I will 
first analyse the conflict between PTA jurisdiction norms and the WTO DSU norms in the 
light of lex posterior and lex specialis rules. I will finish this chapter by analysing the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the question of jurisdictional overlaps as a normative 
issue. 
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2.4.3.1. Lex posterior        
The doctrine of lex posterior establishes the principle of later law superseding earlier law. 
This principle is the opposite of the maxim of lex prior, which states the superiority of the 
earlier treaty.
240
 The lex posterior rule has long roots
241
 and it is recognised as one of the 
conflict-solution principles of international law.
242
 In the context of treaties, the principle 
has also codified in the VCLT.  
Article 30 of the VCLT states the temporal rule of lex posterior derogate legi priori for 
defining the relationship between two subsequent treaties. According to Article 30(3) 
VCLT, when all members to a treaty are also members to a later treaty, the earlier treaty 
applies only when its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty. According to 
Article 30(4), when the members to the later treaty do not include all those of the earlier 
treaty, the application of the treaties depends on the parties in question. As between such 
WTO members that are members to both treaties, the rule of Article 30(3) applies, in other 
words the later treaty supersedes the earlier one.
243
 But when one is a member of both 
treaties and the other is only member to one of them, the treaty to which both are members 
determines their rights and obligations.
244
 According to Article 30(5) Paragraph 4 is 
without prejudice to Article 41 VCLT.  
Article 30(4) VCLT supports the inter se modifications, and reflects in that way the 
contractual freedom on countries.
245
 The rule seems to be accepted to be applicable in 
cases where treaty inter se modifies an earlier one, as can be argued to be the case here 
with the PTA and WTO provisions.
246
 According to the requirements of Article 30 of the 
VCLT, the treaties must relate to the same-subject matter for the later, successive treaty to 
override the earlier one. The issue of the same subject-matter was addressed in section 2.2 
above. According to Koskenniemi, two treaties address the same subject-matter if the 
fulfilment of the obligations deriving from one of the treaties affects the fulfilment of the 
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obligations arising from the other treaty.
247
 As I have already noted, the rights and 
obligations provided in the WTO covered agreement as well as by the PTAs overlap, 
which is the reason for a possibility of a conflict in the first place. Hence, the requirement 
for same subject-matter is fulfilled in this context. The subsequent PTA norm shall 
override the earlier WTO norm in case the requirements of Article 30 of the VCLT are 
fulfilled. It must be noted that not all current PTAs were established after the WTO 
covered agreements, one of the most notable example of a prior PTA being NAFTA. In 
this case the doctrine of lex specialis might come into play. Nevertheless, in case a later 
PTA treaty has successfully inter se modified the WTO norms, the DSU provisions are 
applicable only to the extent that they are compatible with the PTA jurisdiction clause. 
Article 30 of the VCLT and the lex posterior principle is however residuary and gives way 
to any treaty provision regulating priority.
248
 A specific priority rule therefore supersedes 
the rules of Article 30 of the VCLT. In case the prohibition not to add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations of WTO members stated in Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU is seen 
as a priority rule, the lex posterior rule is not applicable. By the same token, if PTA 
jurisdiction clauses including a specific choice of forum provision or a provision stating 
exclusive jurisdiction are applicable and seen as valid priority rules, the doctrine of lex 
posterior is not even necessary to override the jurisdiction of the WTO. The lex posterior 
rule would probably therefore not find much relevance in this context. 
2.4.3.2. Lex specialis        
According to a general principle of law, a norm that is more detailed and goes in more 
depth in the same subject-matter than another norm overrides that other, more general 
norm. The principle of lex specialis is not codified in the VCLT, but has a long history and 
is recognised as a general principle in legal doctrine.
249
 The justification behind the 
principle can be traced to the will of the states, as more specific rules clarify the intentions 
of the contracting parties more clearly than general rules.
250
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The rule of lex specialis derogat legi generali means that treaties would have to be 
compared in terms of their “normative density251”. According to Koskenniemi, the issue of 
generality and speciality can be viewed in two somewhat different ways. Firstly, a more 
specific rule can be seen as a specification or an update to the more general rule, and in this 
regard it should be read together with the more general rule and not as incompatible with 
it.
252
 The alternative way to apply the principle is to see it purely as a conflict rule. Read in 
this light, the principle clarifies the relationship between two non-hierarchical rules that are 
in conflict with each other. In this scenario the lex specialis is an exception to the general 
rule and not merely an update.
253
 In this respect it is important to note that the special rules 
derogating from more general rules must have at least the same “legal rank” in terms of 
their validity.
254
 Therefore a rule that is more binding on the parties, even if more general 
in nature, cannot be overruled by a more specific but less binding rule.  
The principle can be applied in various different contexts. It might for example come into 
play firstly when interpreting two different treaties, secondly when there is a conflict 
between a treaty and non-treaty instrument, such as custom, and thirdly also when 
interpreting norms that stem from the same treaty.
255
 In the WTO context, the principle has 
been applied within the WTO framework
256
 but not between WTO agreement and a 
non-WTO agreement. The panel has stated that the rule of lex specialis is in any case 
subsidiary.
257
  
In the context of WTO DSU provisions and PTA jurisdiction clauses the principle of lex 
specialis would be applied as a conflict rule as the PTA norms dealing with jurisdiction are 
derogations of the WTO norms. There is an actual inconsistency between the two norms if 
a matter is initiated in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings despite a jurisdiction 
clause stating the primacy of the PTA dispute settlement system in that specific situation. 
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The matter of legal validity of the norms goes back to the discussion of Articles XXIV of 
the GATT and V of the GATS and the possibility to apply non-WTO norms in the dispute 
settlement of the WTO.   
2.4.3.2.1. Specific jurisdiction clauses as lex specialis 
The ILC has stated in its draft articles on the Law of Treaties that if a treaty contains a 
provision determining its relationship towards another treaty, no matter whether it is later 
or prior in time, such provisions are to be taken into account in determining the relevant 
norm in a conflict situation between successive treaties relating to the same subject-
matter.
258
 As Vauhgan Lowe put it, “In circumstances where the parties have made special 
provision for a certain category of disputes, in the absence of any indication to the 
contrary it must be supposed that they intended that it is this special provision, and not 
some more general acceptance of the jurisdiction of another tribunal, that they intended 
should be applied to disputes in that category.”259 
Also Shany has argued in favour of forum selection clauses, rationalising this by the 
expression of the will and the consent of the parties that can be observed in the clause.
260
 
This view is shared by Pauwelyn, who has stated that a conflict clause should be accepted 
and taken into consideration unless it conflicts with jus cogens norms, goes against Art 41 
VCLT or is overruled by a later expression of state intent.
261
 The priority rules included in 
a treaty cannot affect the rights of third parties, as is determined by the rule of pacta tertiis 
non nocent.
262
 Such clauses can therefore only affect the relationship between countries 
that are both members to both agreements. The relationship between a country that is a 
member to only one of two agreements and a country that is member to both of them is 
governed by the treaty to which both of them are members. With such a norm, contracting 
states can determine also the future priority of a treaty, making it illegal for later treaties to 
overrule its norms. This obviously alters the lex posterior rule. However, Article 30(5) 
VCLT specifically states that the article is without prejudice to Article 41 VCLT, and 
therefore there is no contradiction with such a priority norm and Article 30 VCLT. In the 
light of Article 41 VCLT, a prior norm stating its primacy to later treaties makes it illegal 
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for later treaties to inter se modify such norms in the prior treaty, and thus such 
contradictory provisions could not be included in the later treaty in the first place. 
There is no specific priority rule in the DSU determining its primacy over later treaties, 
unless Articles 3.2 and 19.2 are considered as such. Specific jurisdiction clauses are 
however common in PTAs. If the applicability of PTA norms is accepted, jurisdiction 
clauses included in PTAs should always be taken into consideration in a conflict situation, 
and the WTO panel should consider its jurisdiction in the light of such a provision. Such 
provisions do not affect the rights of third parties, as the conflict affects only WTO 
members that are members to both agreements.
263
 PTA norms are often both lex specialis 
and lex posterior, which should clarify the conflict situation even further. In the light of 
these conflict rules, each situation should be looked individually to determine the dominant 
law. If there is a valid jurisdiction clause in a PTA that inter se modifies the WTO covered 
agreements as for between its members, the PTA norm prevails pursuant to the lex 
specialis rule
264
 and can overrule the jurisdiction of the WTO in that matter. 
2.5 Concluding remarks on the normative conflict 
When analysing the overlaps of jurisdiction between the WTO and PTAs as a normative 
matter, there are three questions to be asked. First, is the PTA WTO-consistent in the sense 
of Article XXIV of the GATT and V of the GATS? If it is not, the PTA is not legal and the 
jurisdiction clause also has no effects to the jurisdiction of the WTO. The question of 
legality of specific jurisdiction clauses ought to be analysed through the application of 
Article 41(1)(b) of the VCLT. If the conditions are fulfilled, the provision is legal. Second 
question is, is the PTA norm applicable in the WTO dispute. In this regard I have 
concluded that the WTO panels should accept the inter se modifications made by the 
members on their procedural rights arising from the DSU as the covered agreements do not 
prevent members from making such modifications. These modifying norms should then be 
considered in the WTO dispute as applicable law when considering the jurisdiction of the 
panel. The limitations on the panel’s jurisdiction in Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU do 
not affect the specific agreement to contract out of the DSU provisions and therefore the 
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panel is not banned from considering them. Last question is which norm overrules the 
other, the WTO or the PTA norm. The answer to this is found by applying the conflict 
rules of public international law. As jurisdiction clauses in PTAs are clear conflict clauses 
and therefore lex specialis, they should overrule WTO jurisdiction norms in the case the 
requirements of the PTA norm are fulfilled.  
We now know the possible alternative ways to address the issue of jurisdictional conflicts 
at a normative level. What remains to be done is to find an answer to the question asked in 
the beginning of this chapter. Can a jurisdictional clause included in a PTA exclude the 
WTO’s jurisdiction? Is it possible for members to contract out of the DSU provisions? 
Under the current state of law the questions remains without a definite answer. Based on 
the structure suggested above, I argue that there is a valid legal basis for an argument based 
on a PTA norm, and that the Appellate Body report in Peru – Agricultural Products did 
not close this door. However, because there seems to be significant opposition for such an 
interpretation, other ways to overcome the possible overlaps must be analysed as well. 
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3. Jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and PTAs as a procedural issue 
3.1. General principles of international law – A Solution to the problem? 
If jurisdictional conflicts cannot be solved at a normative level, or if a PTA does not 
include a jurisdiction clause in the first place, solutions to the issues of overlapping 
jurisdictions have to be found elsewhere. General rules of international law have been 
suggested to offer a solution to this problem. These principles have been established to 
prevent simultaneous or subsequent proceedings which endanger predictability and 
coherence, and for this purpose they create limits for the procedural rights of states. 
General principles of law are one of the sources of international law found in Article 38 of 
the ICJ Statute. They are considered as secondary sources of law, meaning that they are 
hierarchically at a lower rank than norms deriving from treaties and custom.
265
 These 
principles are mostly used to fill the gaps in treaties and customary rules, and they 
therefore offer “fall-back” when a solution cannot otherwise be found.266 For this reason, 
and because these principles were not created to address a specific situation but are 
intended to have a broad scope of application, they are open-textured and can be applied in 
various different situations.
267
  
General principles of international law are often derived from domestic legal systems, and 
therefore their applicability is not always clear in the field of international law. Already in 
1927 H. Lauterpacht examined the issue of these private law principles as analogously 
applicable as a source of law in the international law context.
268
 According to Lauterpacht, 
the question is whether the principle is universally adopted, and if it is, it must be 
analogously applicable also as a general principle of international law.
269
 When treaties 
and custom do not provide an answer or rules in a specific situation, recourse must be had 
to the general principles of international law.
270
 This is the fall-back purpose of these 
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principles. Without recourse to these principles, the work of international tribunals would 
become impossible.
271
 
The importance of general principles of international law has been supported by 
jurisprudence from early on. It has been confirmed that when a treaty remains silent on or 
does not regulate a certain issue, and also does not contract out of pre-existing law, these 
general principles addressing the issue are to be applied.
272
 The Permanent Court of 
International Law (PCIJ) confirmed this in the Chorzów Factory case
273
 in relation to 
obligations to make reparations. The ICJ has addressed the issue in respect of rules on 
treaty termination in the South West Africa
274
 and Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project
275
 cases, 
and on exhaustion of local remedies in the ELSI case.
276
 These principles are not WTO 
norms, which again poses the problem of sources of law before the WTO tribunals. WTO 
tribunals have however applied general principles of international law as a fall-back in the 
past when fulfilling the gaps left in the covered agreements, especially in relation to 
procedural questions such as these at hand.
277
  
Many of the general principles under consideration are legal principles derived from 
domestic legal orders.
278
 In this section, I will fist address the possibility to prevent 
subsequent and simultaneous proceedings over the same matter through applying the 
principles of res judicata, lis pendens and estoppel. Secondly, I will focus on cooperation 
between tribunals and the good faith aspects of the conduct of states by analysing comity 
and the doctrines of good faith and the abuse of process. I will finish with a brief analysis 
on the question of the most convenient forum by studying the applicability of the doctrine 
of forum conveniens on the issue of conflicting jurisdictions between the WTO and PTAs.  
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3.1.1. Res judicata 
The doctrine of res judicata promotes the finality of judgements.
279
 The main purpose of 
the principle is to prevent situations where the same dispute between the same parties is 
initiated a second time after it has already been settled by one tribunal.
280
 Salles has 
identified three functions for the principle: firstly it “preserves the stability of individual 
legal relationships by ensuring that disputes will come to an end”,281 secondly it “preserves 
the stability of legal systems, guaranteeing that identical cases will not be decided 
differently”282 and thirdly, it “protects the respondent in the second proceeding, avoiding 
relitigation”.283 The PCIJ noted in the Société Commerciale De Belgique case that 
“[r]ecognition of an awards res judicata means nothing else than recognition of the fact 
that the terms of that award are definitive and obligatory”.284 As Lowe has pointed out, 
conflicting findings by different tribunals over the issues and facts threaten predictability, 
but also undermine the rule of law.
285
 The doctrine has also the incentivising effect for the 
countries to carry out judgements.
286
  
The notion of res judicata has been specifically included in some international 
agreements,
287
 but it has been accepted as a general principle of law and therefore it can be 
applied even without a specific reference in the constitutive text.
288
 The scope of res 
judicata is usually seen to include the points expressly determined in the dispositive part of 
a judgement,
289
 or such that are addressed and determined by the tribunal.
290
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For the principle of res judicata to be applicable, three conditions must be fulfilled 
simultaneously. Firstly, the parties to the dispute must be the same; secondly, the request 
must be the same and thirdly, the cause of action, or the grounds of the claim must be the 
same.
291
 If the conditions are fulfilled, the case can be found inadmissible before the 
second court.
292
 The requirements for the identity of parties and grounds of the claim are 
self-evident; the intention is to ensure that it is indeed the same issue that arises in both 
cases between the same parties.
293
 The identity of request is more complex, as it might not 
preclude legally different causes of action, meaning different legal reasoning, even if they 
are based on the same facts.
294
 The question of how far these requirements are to be taken 
in international law is not settled.
295
 Due to the differences in views taken as to the 
requirements of res judicata, no common standard can be established. 
If absolute identity of form and substance is required, the applicability of res judicata is 
substantially limited.
296
 Formal sources of law will in almost all cases be different in two 
disputes initiated under two different dispute settlement mechanisms. If this would lead to 
the inapplicability of the res judicata principle, it would serve of little use in the 
coordination of international tribunals.
297
 This is the reason why the res judicata effect is 
difficult to apply to relations between different international tribunals established by 
different treaties. Some authors have stated that there is no valid principle of res judicata 
applicable between international tribunals, at least not yet.
298
 Even if the parties and the 
grounds are the same, the law would be different, and also specific defences available 
might differ in addition to the two mechanism having different procedural rights.
299
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However, if international tribunals were to adopt a more flexible application of the 
doctrine, it could be more useful in the field of international adjudication.  
The res judicata effect of judgements has been accepted to be applicable within the WTO 
system.
300
 However, so far no WTO tribunal has faced the issue of res judicata effect of 
awards issued by different international tribunals. In order for non-WTO decisions to have 
res judicata effect on the jurisdiction of the WTO, the tribunals would have to first accept 
the position of res judicata as a binding principle of international law, and secondly 
establish that the ruling of the first tribunal fulfils the three requirements set out above.
301
  
If complete identity of form and substance is required for the application of res judicata, it 
would not be useful in settling the conflicts between the jurisdictions of the WTO and 
PTAs. Even if a specific dispute had been already settled under the dispute settlement 
mechanism of a PTA, it would not prevent the WTO from exercising its jurisdiction over 
the same factual situation as the law governing the two disputes would not be same. 
Pauwelyn sees this as an obvious limitation to the applicability of the principle,
302
 and 
Kwak and Marceau are also of the view that it would be difficult for WTO tribunals to 
decline from exercising jurisdiction based on a res judicata effect of a PTA ruling.
303
 It 
seems that the res judicata principle does not offer much help in solving the conflicts 
arising from the overlapping jurisdictions between the WTO and PTAs, although no 
definite answer to its applicability can be given. 
3.1.2. Estoppel 
Estoppel “prevents one party from taking advantage of another when the former by his 
actions has let the latter to act in a certain manner detrimental to the latter’s own 
interests”.304 The Panel in Guatemala – Cement II stated that “[e]stoppel is premised on the 
view that where one party has been induced to act in reliance on the assurances of another 
party, in such a way that it would be prejudiced were the other party later to change its 
position, such a change in position is 'estopped', that is precluded”.305 The principle of 
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estoppel has indeed been considered to be based on the idea of preclusion,
306
 which even 
those domestic systems that do not recognise estoppel as such apply.
307
 The principle of 
estoppel is closely linked to the principle of good faith
308
 and has been considered to be a 
general principle of international law.
309
 The scope of the doctrine is unclear, but it has 
been applied in international adjudication.
310
 Mitchell has argued that WTO tribunals have 
inherent jurisdiction to rule on claims of estoppel.
311
 However, the case law regarding the 
applicability of the estoppel principle does not appear to be coherent.
312
 
The doctrine has different variations under national laws. Although their relevance in the 
context of international law can be questioned, they might offer some insight to the 
principle.
313
 In the English legal system, there is an “issue estoppel” rule which requires 
“(i) that the same question has been decided; (ii) that the judicial decision which is said to 
create the estoppel was final, and (iii) that the parties to the judicial decision or their 
privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is 
raised or their privies.“314 The only difference with the res judicata principle and the 
English issue estoppel doctrine is the absence of the requirement for identity of legal cause 
of action. It has therefore broader application than res judicata.
315
 Under the US law there 
is another version of the principle called collateral estoppel, which differs from the res 
judicata principle by extending the res judicata effect of a judgement to same issues which 
however arise in different context and in some cases even to different parties.
316
 It seems 
therefore that by adopting either the principle of issue estoppel or collateral estoppel, a 
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prior decision by a PTA tribunal concerning the same issue could be given res judicata 
effect.
317
  
WTO panels have not been inclined to adopt such reading of the principle. In Argentina –
 Poultry, the Panel was faced with the question of estoppel and subsequent proceedings. In 
that case, Brazil had already challenged the measure before an ad hoc arbitral tribunal 
established under the MERCOSUR agreement prior to initiating the dispute for the second 
time in the WTO dispute settlement system.
318
 Argentina raised a preliminary issue and 
requested that the Panel would refrain from ruling on the basis of the prior MERCOSUR 
proceedings.
319
 Argentina based its claim on the principle of estoppel, and argued that it is 
applicable when “(i) a statement of fact which is clear and unambiguous, and which (ii) is 
voluntary, unconditional, and authorized, is (iii) relied on in good faith”.320 The Panel 
considered that the suggested requirements were not fulfilled in that specific case, which is 
why the principle was not applicable at least under those circumstances. The Panel found 
“no evidence on the record that Brazil made an express statement that it would not bring 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings in respect of measures previously challenged through 
MERCOSUR.”321 As reference to the third requirement proposed by Argentina, the Panel 
stated that “[i]n our view, merely being inconvenienced by alleged statements by Brazil is 
not sufficient for Argentina to demonstrate that it was induced to act in reliance of such 
alleged statements.”322  
Mitchell and Heaton have studied the possibility to apply the estoppel principle in the 
presence of a jurisdiction clause included in a PTA. They first point out that jurisdiction 
clauses make “clear and unambiguous” representations on which both parties rely.323 This 
is the essence of the estoppel principle, and it therefore seems that a jurisdiction clause 
would call for its application if one of the parties acted inconsistently with such clause in 
bringing the case before a WTO panel.
324
 However, Mitchell and Heaton also note that the 
in EC – Sugar325 the Appellate Body was reluctant to apply the estoppel principle to limit 
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the possibility to initiate the WTO dispute settlement system.
326
 In that case the Appellate 
Body stated that the principle has never been applied in the WTO, and that “it is far from 
clear that the estoppel principle applies in the context of WTO dispute settlement”.327 The 
Appellate Body also stated that if the principle were to be applied, its application would 
have to fall within the narrow parameters of Article 3.7 of the DSU, which obliges 
members to consider whether action under the WTO procedures would be fruitful, and also 
of Article 3.10 of the DSU, which mandates the members to engage in WTO dispute 
settlement procedures in good faith.
328
  
Mitchell and Heaton do not however see this as a complete exclusion of the principle of 
estoppel, and state that “if Members must act in good faith from the point of initiation of a 
dispute onwards, which obviously includes the actual initiation of a dispute, there is no 
reason why estoppel could not operate to prevent a claim being brought, even if the 
estoppel was based on representations that had occurred prior to initiation.”329 The authors 
thus conclude the estoppel principle is capable of creating a legal impediment to the 
exercise of the jurisdiction of the panel.
330
 
It appears that at least without a specific promise from the other party not to invoke a 
second proceeding in the WTO system, and without real actions taken by the other party 
based on this promise, the principle of estoppel is not applicable. The Panel in Argentina – 
Poultry did not determine whether it considered the conditions proposed by Argentina 
sufficient for the application of estoppel, or even whether it had the authority to apply the 
principle in the first place.
331
 The requirement of clear and unambiguous promise was 
however also made in EC – Aircraft,332 which would suggest that it is considered as a 
condition to create estoppel. It could be argued that a jurisdiction clause creates such a 
promise that could be enforced through application of the estoppel principle. This approach 
would allow giving effect to a jurisdiction clause without the problem of direct conflict of 
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norms. No WTO tribunal has excluded the possibility to apply the estoppel principle, 
which is why its position in the WTO system remains open.
333
 
3.1.3. Lis alibi pendens 
Lis alibi pendens is another procedural principle derived from domestic law that aims to 
prevent multiple proceedings. The core of the principle prohibits a court from accepting a 
case which is already pending before another competent court.
334
 The other court has not in 
this situation given its judgement yet, but the case is being processed or is pending when 
the case is brought before the second forum. The object of lis alibi pendens is the 
prevention of the possibility of conflicting judgements and the avoidance of a race to 
judgment between two tribunals.
335
 The lis alibi pendens doctrine also requires the parallel 
actions to be substantially identical.
336
  
Lis alibi pendens has a strong footing in domestic legal orders, but its standing in the 
context of international tribunals is far from clear.
337
 The jurisprudence concerning the 
principle has been inconclusive.
338
 Some tribunals have rejected the possibility to apply the 
rule altogether whilst other decisions have cautioned that the interests of the parties and the 
overreaching goals of the competing treaty regimes must be taken into consideration.
339
 
The usefulness of the doctrine has faced criticism and some argue that the “first forum 
decides” outcome of the rule only makes sense between hierarchically equal courts, 
whereas different international tribunals might vary in hierarchy, procedural efficiency, 
legitimacy and experience.
340
 These differences have been said to be characteristic to 
international courts and tribunals, as it is difficult to find that two international proceedings 
are the same or even comparable.
341
 The position of lis alibi pendens as a general principle 
of law is controversial, and some authors conclude that it is merely a civil law doctrine.
342
 
There is a risk in applying lis alibi pendens in conflict situations between the WTO and 
PTA tribunals. For example in the context of NAFTA, if a case that has already been 
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initiated under its dispute settlement mechanism is brought before the WTO panel, and the 
WTO applies the lis alibi pendens rule and decides that it cannot exercise jurisdiction over 
the case, the whole dispute might be left in limbo if one of the parties refuses to appoint a 
panellist in the NAFTA proceedings. This situation could have arisen in the Mexico – Soft 
Drinks case had the WTO Panel applied the doctrine and refused to exercise its 
jurisdiction.
343
 However, it is difficult to find a difference between these types of situations 
and a situation where a PTA includes a jurisdiction clause that has a lis pendens effect, 
meaning that it prohibits parallel proceedings after the dispute has been initiated under one 
forum. 
Traditionally, the first court is required to have a full competence to determine the issue in 
order for the lis alibi pendens rule to apply, which is almost never the case in international 
adjudication, as different courts only have limited jurisdiction.
344
 A non-WTO tribunal 
cannot assess alleged breaches of WTO norms. Therefore the same contra-argument that 
was applied for res judicata has been said to be valid in this context as well; the applicable 
law, specific defences, procedural rights and remedies differ in different systems, and 
therefore the requirements cannot be fulfilled in the WTO-PTA relationship.
345
 The 
outcome seems to turn against the application of lis alibi pendens, as it does not seem to 
have a lot of room in international adjudication and definitely not in the WTO context. The 
requirements set for its application preclude most of the situations lis alibi pendens could 
be used in. 
3.1.4. Comity 
It has been suggested that WTO tribunals should decline to exercise jurisdiction under 
certain circumstances on the basis of the doctrine of comity. Leaning on the doctrine of 
comity, a tribunal can decline to exercise jurisdiction firstly when it considers that the 
matter would be overall more conveniently settled under another forum,
346
 or only until the 
case has been first solved in another forum.
347
  It is also possible for a tribunal to apply the 
principle when a dispute is pending before or has already been decided by another tribunal 
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in cases where the conditions of res judicata or lis pendens are not fulfilled.
348
 Comity can 
be relied on only when it is obvious that no serious injustice is inflicted upon either of the 
parties by declining to exercise jurisdiction.
349
  
Comity does not limit the possibilities of tribunals to exercise jurisdiction the same way 
other principles addressed here do, as it does not create legal obligations and therefore does 
not bind courts and tribunals.
350
 Comity forwards co-operation between courts and operates 
in a flexible manner, offering a tool for international tribunals when they consider that it 
would be unreasonable or inappropriate under certain circumstances to exercise 
jurisdiction.
351
 It is a method of improving international harmonisation.
352
 Shany argues 
that exercising comity in addition to the rules of res judicata and lis pendens would solve 
many of the problems arising from overlapping jurisdictions.
353
 However, the doctrine 
seems overall rather ambiguous.
354
 Its position in international law is unclear and it has 
been applied mostly in domestic legal systems.
355
 
The arbitral tribunal established under UNCLOS referred to comity in the MOX Plant 
Case, which was already addressed in section 1.2. The case raised the question of 
jurisdiction to determine a dispute about a discharge of radioactive waste into the Irish Sea 
by a processing plant that belonged to the United Kingdom. The dispute raised issues 
under three different instruments, and the arbitral tribunal underlined “mutual respect” and 
the doctrine of comity in stating that it would be inappropriate to proceed further in the 
proceedings under those circumstances. The arbitral tribunal stated that the possibility of 
two conflicting decisions would not help the parties to resolve the dispute.
356
 
Comity has not been widely studied in the WTO context. Mitchell and Heaton point out 
that in Mexico – Soft Drinks357 Mexico attempted to prevent the WTO proceedings on the 
basis of a comity approach, even though it did not per se refer to the principle.
358
 The 
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Appellate Body did not accept this argument, and stated that it did not have the discretion 
to decline to exercise jurisdiction, except in situations that involve a legal impediment.
359
 
Such an obstacle was not considered to exist in that case. Gao and Lim have also disputed 
the application of comity, arguing that it has no textual basis in the DSU, also referring to 
the prohibition to ‘add to or diminish the rights and obligations’ of Article 3.2 of the 
DSU.
360
 However, none of the procedural principles used to avoid conflicting judgements 
have textual basis in the DSU, so if this argument is accepted the use of all general 
principles in the WTO context is precluded. It has to be also noted that the WTO tribunals 
have applied principles that have no textual basis in the covered agreements in the past.
361
 
However, other authors have questioned the applicability of comity as well, and for 
example Michell and Heaton argue that it is incompatible with the requirements of the 
DSU and therefore cannot be applied.
362
 
It seems unlikely that WTO tribunals would decline to exercise jurisdiction merely based 
on a comity approach. Perhaps in circumstances where there is also a valid PTA 
jurisdiction clause binding both parties the panel could find assistance in applying the 
principle. Nevertheless, based on the Appellate Body’s statement in Mexico – Soft Drinks, 
the current state of law offers little support as to the possibilities to apply comity in the 
WTO–PTA context. 
3.1.5. Abuse of rights and good faith 
The principle of abuse of rights governs situations in which a country exercises its rights in 
a way that affects the rights of another country negatively, in which a right is exercised 
intentionally to reach a different end than was provided for when creating the right, and in 
which a state acts arbitrarily.
363
 It could be argued that by initiating a second proceeding on 
the same matter, a state is acting in bad faith. This sort of act could be seen as harassment 
of the other party, and a state bringing the same case before a second tribunal can be 
argued to abuse its procedural rights.
364
  
Abuse of process could also be found in situations where a claim is “frivolous or 
manifestly groundless” or the dispute is based on a claim that should have been raised in 
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earlier proceedings.
365
 Under such circumstances, the panel could decline to exercise 
jurisdiction not due to the multiple proceedings, but on the basis of the “inherently 
vexatious nature of the proceedings”.366 A prohibition against the abuse of rights has been 
argued to be a general principle of law.
367
 At least the doctrine is seen as a well-established 
principle, but it has been said there are not many occasions in which it could be used.
368
  It 
has however been referred to by the PCIJ
369
 and also in the ICJ
370
 jurisprudence, and 
therefore cannot be regarded as a completely theoretical question.  
As for the principle of good faith, in Argentina – Poultry, Argentina asserted that Brazil 
failed to act in good faith when initiating the WTO dispute settlement system after losing 
the case in the MERCOSUR proceedings.
371
 The Panel rejected this claim, but accepted 
that it is possible for a panel to find that a member has acted in bad faith.
372
 The threshold 
was set quite high, as the Panel stated that in order for a panel to find that a member has 
failed to act in good faith, that member must have violated a substantive provision of the 
WTO covered agreements, and there must also be something “more than a mere 
violation”.373 As Argentina had not even claimed that Brazil had violated a substantive 
provision of one of the covered agreements, the requirements were not met and Brazil 
could not have been found to be acting in bad faith in initiating the dispute in the WTO 
dispute settlement.
374
 
In Peru – Agricultural Products Peru claimed that Guatemala had acted contrary to its 
good faith –obligation by challenging the disputed measure in WTO litigation. The 
Appellate Body stated that any waiver limiting members’ procedural rights under the WTO 
agreements must be made clearly for it to be a basis for a good faith –argument.375 The 
Appellate Body also stated that “Member's compliance with its good faith obligations … 
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should be ascertained on the basis of actions taken in relation to, or within the context of, 
the rules and procedures of the DSU.”376 The Appellate Body also stated that it considers 
that members may not relinquish their rights and obligations under the DSU beyond the 
settlement of specific disputes.
377
   
In Peru – Agricultural Products the Appellate Body did not find anything that would have 
prohibited the respondent Guatemala from initiating the WTO dispute settlement system, 
and as both members even agreed that Guatemala was not procedurally barred from 
initiating the dispute, no breach of a good faith was found.
378
 The Appellate Body’s 
reasoning seems to follow the Argentina – Poultry Panel’s reasoning about a violation of a 
substantive WTO provision. The requirement of limiting the waiver to a specific dispute 
seems to narrow the scope of provisions that could be found to create such an agreement 
that could be relied upon on the basis of a good faith –argument. However, clearly 
stipulated jurisdiction clauses that make specific reference to the DSU may be found to 
fulfil the requirements.
379
 
In line with this argument, one suggestion on the possibility to allege a violation of a 
substantive DSU provision is to base the claim on a breach of Article 3.10 of the DSU. 
Article 3.10 of the DSU states that members are to engage into WTO dispute settlement 
procedures in good faith. According to this approach, when a member acts inconsistently 
with a clear statement, such as a fork-in-the-road jurisdiction clause, it breaches its 
procedural good faith obligations arising from Article 3.10 of the DSU.
380
 This breach of 
the good faith obligation creates a legal impediment for the panel to exercise its 
jurisdiction.
381
 The claim in this respect is that the jurisdiction of the panel is not validly 
established, as the Article 3.10 of the DSU is breached.
382
 A breach of procedural good 
faith could be found when the principle of good faith is specifically invoked as a breach of 
Article 3.10 of the DSU, referring to a specific statement made by the other member.
383
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Nates and Descheemaeker suggest that in case the specific statement is based on a 
fork-in-the-road jurisdiction clause, the clause has to be exercised before it can be used as a 
basis for the inadmissibility claim.
384
 This approach would allow the recognition of the 
jurisdiction clauses in PTAs, as well as give significance to the acts of members. It is also 
in line with the Panel’s statements in Argentina – Poultry and the Appellate Body’s 
findings in Peru – Agricultural Products, as a substantive provision of the DSU would be 
alleged to be violated. This approach would also avoid the question of applicable law, as 
the PTA jurisdiction clause would only be used as a means of interpretation of Article 3.10 
of the DSU. 
It would not seem unreasonable to assert that a country that initiates the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism after for example losing a case in a PTA dispute settlement is acting 
in bad faith and also abusing its procedural rights. Mitchell and Heaton point out that such 
finding would not mean that the member would be considered to be acting in bad faith in 
the sense of mala fides, “entering into an agreement with no intention to uphold it”, but 
merely that a member has restricted its ability to invoke its right to enter into WTO 
proceedings, and is now acting against this restriction.
385
 Mitchell and Heaton consider that 
the principle of abuse of process creates a legal impediment for the WTO tribunal, because 
it prevents the exercise of the right to initiate WTO dispute settlement altogether.
386
  
In the light of awards in Argentina – Poultry and Peru – Agricultural Products, it seems 
unlikely that the doctrines of bad faith and abuse of process would offer a tool for 
assessing the problem of multiple proceedings without the existence of PTA jurisdiction 
clause.  Kwak and Marceau are of the view that it is very unlikely that a WTO tribunal 
would decline to exercise jurisdiction based on a claim of bad faith or abuse of process.
387
 
They argue that states are often bound by several overlapping jurisdictions, and if they 
have negotiated the possibility of referring a dispute to various fora, it must be assumed 
that they have also intended to “retain the possibility of using such fora on separate and 
distinct occasions”.388 However, the suggestion based on Article 3.10 could offer a solid 
argument based on good faith –obligation for the respondent in case the claimant has 
violated a clear and unambiguous PTA jurisdiction clause, especially if it has already been 
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exercised. The possibility of basing a claim on this argument is still unresolved in WTO 
jurisprudence. 
3.1.6. Forum non-conveniens 
Forum non-conveniens provides a possibility to decline from exercising jurisdiction when 
there is another forum which is “clearly or distinctly more appropriate” than that forum, in 
other words, which is, “a forum in which the case may be tried more suitably for the 
interests of all the parties and the ends of justice.”389 The forum non-conveniens doctrine 
has a lot in common with the estoppel doctrine, as it also based on the vexatious and 
oppressive nature of the actions of the claimant.
390
 As all the other principles outlined in 
this section, the forum non-conveniens is also rooted in domestic legal systems, and was 
used to refer cases to foreign proceedings.
391
 Forum non-conveniens is mostly used in 
common law systems and therefore it is not as clearly accepted as a general principle of 
law.
392
 
In municipal systems, the principle could have been used for several reasons, one example 
of which is a situation where better understanding of foreign law or a need for experts in 
certain aspects of the dispute was needed to solve a case.
393
 The requirements vary from 
state to state, but things that are considered include issues such as expenses, availability of 
witnesses, the place where the parties reside, and so on.
394
 Such issues of venue do not 
however truly arise in the context of international litigation, at least not in the same way as 
between domestic systems.
395
  
Another argument against the use of the doctrine in the context of international litigation is 
the fact that states have agreed to be bound by the jurisdiction of international tribunals. In 
the domestic context, no agreement is made as domestic courts have mandatory 
jurisdiction over disputes that are within their personal jurisdiction. Therefore, in the 
international law context, the respondent does not need the same level of protection, as it 
has willingly agreed to multiple, potentially overlapping jurisdictions.
396
 Lowe argues that 
there is no need to maintain as close a level of harmony between international tribunals as 
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there is between national courts.
397
 The doctrine could be applied when demands of 
efficiency in the administration of justice indicate that the court should decline to exercise 
jurisdiction, but Lowe argues that the required level of permanence, predictable bases of 
personal jurisdiction, plenary subject-matter jurisdiction, among other requirements, are 
not yet fulfilled in international litigation.
398
  
It has been argued that the doctrine could never find basis in the WTO context, as the 
WTO forum is always a convenient, even exclusive forum for addressing breaches of the 
covered agreements.
399
 This of course does not change the issue that the same matter could 
be dealt with under the dispute settlement mechanism of a PTA, as the rights and 
obligations are often almost identical under the two systems, even though the PTA tribunal 
could not address breaches of the covered agreements. The convenient forum for 
addressing breaches of WTO agreements is of course the WTO itself, but the question is 
whether a PTA tribunal could be more convenient for solving the same matter under its 
own constitutive agreement.  
Pauwelyn and Salles seem to be of the view that as a PTA tribunal could not address the 
breaches of WTO obligations, the forum non-conveniens doctrine cannot find application 
in this context.
400
 They point out that after a tribunal has been found to have jurisdiction, it 
would be difficult for it to decline to exercise this jurisdiction without a clearly established 
legal impediment.
401
 Therefore, it would be difficult for a WTO tribunal to decline to 
exercise its validly established jurisdiction based on a claim that a non-WTO tribunal 
would be a more convenient forum, as this does not create a legal impediment for 
exercising otherwise validly established jurisdiction.  
Pauwelyn and Salles however note that the doctrine could be very useful in international 
adjudication, as it does not include the requirement for same legal cause of action found in 
res judicata and lis alibi pendens principles.
402
 This means that the more convenient forum 
does not have to settle the dispute under the law the less convenient forum would have 
applied. Forum non-conveniens could be a very useful tool especially in determining the 
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conflicting jurisdictions between the WTO and PTAs. Nevertheless, the doctrine does not 
appear to enjoy a great support for application in the context of international litigation. 
3.2. Concluding remarks on the use of general principles as tools to solve the conflict  
It seems unlikely that general principles of international law can directly solve the issue of 
competing jurisdictions in the context of the WTO and PTAs. At least when considered 
individually, the WTO tribunals seem to be rather unwilling to apply the principles in this 
context. Many of the principles are also rather ambiguous and do not have an established 
position in international adjudication. It has been noted that, as these principles derived 
from domestic legal systems do not resolve the issues of forum shopping, the best way to 
avoid the problems would be regulate these overlaps in the constitutive treaties by forum 
selection clauses.
403
 This brings us back to the question of the applicability of jurisdiction 
clauses included in PTAs. 
General principles of international could offer guidance at least in cases where there is a 
jurisdiction clause in a PTA limiting the jurisdiction of the WTO. The principles could be 
very useful in this regard, and also following this application the question of PTA norms as 
applicable law could be avoided. For example Shany has argued that if the doctrine of 
abuse of rights is accepted, it would be applicable in cases where a dispute is brought 
before a tribunal in violation of a jurisdiction clause excluding such right.
404
 In such 
situations, the tribunal should decline jurisdiction based on the abusive exercise of a right 
that has been precluded by a treaty binding that party.
405
 One concrete solution of was 
presented in section 3.1.5, where it was suggested that the respondent could base its claim 
on a violation of Article 3.10 of the DSU when the complainant has violated a 
fork-in-the-road clause in a PTA.  
The same could be said about the estoppel principle, in which case the jurisdiction clause 
in a PTA could be considered to establish a binding promise, excluding the possibility to 
initiate the WTO dispute settlement. Also the doctrine of comity could be found useful in 
situations where a jurisdiction clause indicates that the dispute should be settled in a PTA 
forum and not in the WTO system. It is unclear whether the WTO would be willing to 
apply the principles in this way or not. It can be concluded that these principles do not 
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seem to solve the conflicts or the problem of multiple litigations as such, but if applied 
together with a PTA jurisdiction clause they could, and in my opinion should, offer a way 
for the WTO tribunals to decline to exercise jurisdiction without having to directly apply 
non-WTO jurisdiction clauses as sources of law in WTO litigation. 
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4. The jurisdiction of the WTO – What can the WTO tribunals do? 
4.1. The inherent powers of WTO tribunals 
International tribunals have jurisdiction only when it is explicitly granted to them by the 
parties.
406
 Jurisdiction can be divided into three different elements, which have different 
functions: the subject-matter jurisdiction, the applicable law before the tribunal, and the 
inherent jurisdiction of the tribunal.
407
 The difference between the subject-matter 
jurisdiction and the applicable law before a tribunal was addressed already in section 2.4.2. 
In this section it is especially important to clarify the division between the subject-matter 
jurisdiction and the inherent jurisdiction of a tribunal.
408
  
The subject-matter jurisdiction of the WTO is limited to disputes under WTO covered 
agreements and to the terms of reference of the specific WTO panel.
409
 In contrast, 
inherent jurisdiction “is asserted when an international tribunal faces a question that affects 
its ability to exercise the judicial function assigned to it.”410 This means that the powers of 
WTO tribunals extent outside the WTO covered agreements, as these powers inherent to 
all international tribunals do not derive from these agreements.
411
 I will now examine the 
scope of the inherent jurisdiction in more depth.  
When a tribunal is seized to settle a dispute, it has certain inherent powers that are rooted 
in its judicial functions.
412
 When discussing the inherent jurisdiction of the Court in the 
Nuclear Case Test, the ICJ stated that “such inherent jurisdiction . . . derives from the mere 
existence of the Court as a judicial organ established by the consent of States, and is 
conferred upon it in order that its basic judicial functions may be safeguarded.”413 The 
WTO members have agreed to the jurisdiction of the WTO through DSU provisions.
414
 
WTO tribunals are international judicial bodies, and they therefore have these inherent 
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jurisdictional powers.
415
 The scope of the inherent powers of the WTO tribunals is not 
however clear, although, as mentioned in section 2.4.2., the WTO tribunals have applied 
general principles of international law not included in the covered agreements. The fact 
that WTO tribunals have these inherent powers means that their judicial powers are not 
limited to the texts of the covered agreements. Pauwelyn and Salles argue that the 
confusion between the inherent jurisdiction of WTO tribunals and the subject-matter 
jurisdiction arising from the covered agreements is the reason why many argue that the 
WTO tribunals could never decline to exercise jurisdiction.   
The constitutive document of a tribunal can limit these powers exercised under inherent 
jurisdiction,
416
 and in this case the focus is to be tuned to the covered agreements. 
However, it must be kept in mind that even if the constitutive agreement does not say 
anything about a specific power, it does not mean that the tribunal established under that 
treaty is devoid of it, as international tribunals possess inherent powers even without a 
specific treaty text.  It has been argued that the WTO tribunals have powers to apply 
general principles of international law under their inherent jurisdiction only if such 
principles are not in conflict with the covered agreements.  Trachtman has stated that the 
WTO tribunals should exercise these powers only in relation to certain procedural issues, 
and not extent their application to substantive rights and obligations.
417
   
Such inherent powers that the WTO tribunals are considered to have include the 
competence and also the obligation to determine whether they have jurisdiction to decide 
the matter before turning to rule on issues on the merits.
418
 This competence to decide 
one’s own competence, often referred to as la compétence de la compétence, is considered 
to be invested in every international tribunal’s powers and should be exercised even 
without a claim from the parties.
419
 WTO tribunals have also the powers to determine 
whether they should refrain from exercising their validly established jurisdiction, a power 
governing the issue of admissibility.
420
 The Appellate Body has confirmed that a “legal 
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impediment” could lead to a situation where the panel would refrain from exercising 
jurisdiction.
421
  
In this section, I will first cover the question of the competence of the WTO tribunals to 
determine their jurisdiction. Secondly, I shall address the distinction between jurisdiction 
and admissibility, and the possible approaches it offers to this issue. I will finish by 
analysing the WTO case law on this issue and the conclusions that can be drawn therefrom. 
4.1.2. La compétence de la compétence  
The principle of la compétence de la compétence has long roots and has been recognised 
by several courts in the history of international adjudication.
422
 It is considered to be a 
general principle of international law, and therefore the right and the obligation to 
determine one’s own jurisdiction does not require an express provision in the constitutive 
documents of the court or tribunal.
423
 This compétence is also not based on the acceptance 
of the parties to the dispute, but is an inherent part of the exercise of judicial powers of 
validly established tribunals.
424
 The ICJ stated in the Nottebohm case that the competence 
to decide as to its own jurisdiction and the ability to interpret for this purpose the 
instruments which govern that jurisdiction are powers that every international tribunal 
has.
425 The court underlined the importance of this examination in the context of 
international courts that are of more permanent character. The court stated that: 
“This principle, which is accepted by general international law in the matter of 
arbitration, assumes particular force when the international tribunal is no longer an 
arbitral tribunal constituted by virtue of a special agreement between the parties for the 
purpose of adjudicating on a particular dispute, but is an institution which has been pre-
established by an international instrument defining its jurisdiction and regulating its 
operation.”426 
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The Appellate Body has accepted this obligation in the US – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 
case, which regarded a United States Act allowing civil actions and criminal proceedings 
against importers who had sold foreign-produced goods at prices which were much lower 
than the prices at which they were sold in a relevant foreign market. There the European 
Union argued that the objection to the jurisdiction of the Panel done by the United States 
must be rejected because it was not raised before the Panel in a timely manner.
427
 The 
Appellate Body then noted that “it is a widely accepted rule that an international tribunal is 
entitled to consider the issue of its own jurisdiction on its own initiative, and to satisfy 
itself that it has jurisdiction in any case that comes before it”.428 The Appellate Body also 
stated that “[t]he vesting of jurisdiction in a Panel is a fundamental prerequisite for lawful 
panel proceedings”429 and that “some issues of jurisdiction may be of such a nature that 
they have to be addressed by the Panel at any time”.430 This obligation was further clarified 
by the Appellate Body in the Mexico – Corn Syrup (21.5 – US) case, which was about 
Mexico's imposition of anti-dumping duties on imports of high fructose corn syrup from 
the United States.
431
 There the Appellate Body stated that “panels cannot simply ignore 
issues which go to the root of their jurisdiction” but that they “must deal with such 
issues . . . in order to satisfy themselves that they have authority to proceed”.432 
In the case of overlapping jurisdictions, a tribunal must ask itself whether it has jurisdiction 
notwithstanding the jurisdiction vested in the other tribunal or whether its jurisdiction has 
been modified by the treaty establishing the jurisdiction of that other tribunal.
433
 If the 
jurisdiction of an earlier tribunal has indeed been modified by a treaty later in time, the 
constitutive text of the earlier tribunal continues to apply only to the extent that it is 
compatible with the later one.
434
 The tribunal faced with this question when assessing its 
jurisdiction is to solve the conflict by applying the conflict rules of international law 
presented in section 2.4.3., or when there is an explicit conflict rule in one of the treaties, 
by applying that provision.
435
 If the jurisdiction of the tribunal is overruled by the 
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jurisdiction of another tribunal, it must refuse jurisdiction on the basis of the legal bound 
created by the agreement establishing the jurisdiction of that other tribunal.
436
 
It is undisputed that the WTO panels have la compétence de la compétence, and that they 
must exercise this obligation even without a specific claim made on the issue. However, 
Marceau and Wyatt have argued that it is merely an operational rule, and therefore only 
applies as part of “incidental jurisdiction”, by which they mean that the panel would only 
have competence to examine whether it has jurisdiction to carry out the judicial functions, 
and it cannot refuse substantive jurisdiction in any case.
437
 The extent of the compétence of 
the WTO tribunals is therefore not completely settled. The WTO tribunal has to examine if 
there is something that could exclude its jurisdiction in a matter brought before it. Does the 
jurisdiction provided by the DSU stay intact regardless of an agreement aiming to contract 
out of it or a parallel litigation in the same matter? 
4.2. Excluding jurisdiction or objecting admissibility? 
4.2.1. General remarks about jurisdiction and admissibility 
The principle of la compétence de la compétence deals with the jurisdiction of an 
international tribunal. International tribunals have however also the inherent power to 
determine whether they should exercise their validly established jurisdiction, which refers 
to the admissibility of a case. This leads to the question of whether jurisdictional overlaps 
between the WTO and PTAs should be dealt with through the concept of jurisdiction or 
admissibility. Jurisdiction and admissibility are both preliminary questions that prevent or 
at least postpone a tribunal from ruling on the merits of the dispute.
438
 As Pauwelyn and 
Salles have put it: “[t]he distinction between matters of jurisdiction and admissibility stems 
from the distinction between the scope of a tribunal's decisional authority and the 
conditions governing the exercise of the specific action or process before the tribunal”.439 
The distinction between these two concepts has not been widely recognised in the WTO 
system.  
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Jurisdiction is the basic legal qualification of a tribunal, which allows it to examine 
complaints submitted to it and adjudicate on the merits of the claims.
440
 The requirements 
for the existence of jurisdiction must be fulfilled in order for the tribunal to exercise 
jurisdiction, and if they are not, the defect cannot be overcome.
441
 Objections to 
jurisdiction dispute the authority and the existence of the adjudicative power of the tribunal 
as such.
442
 Questions of admissibility do not concern such fundamental matters, and an 
objection to the admissibility of a claim can be waived and also precluded.
443
 Issues of 
admissibility do not diminish the jurisdiction of the tribunal and in deciding that the case is 
inadmissible, the tribunal is in fact exercising its jurisdiction.
444
 Objections to admissibility 
are related to rules that bind the disputing parties and are not necessarily included in the 
treaty establishing the jurisdiction of the tribunal that is assessing the matter.
445
 Objections 
to admissibility take aim at the specific request or claim in question, and dispute the 
exercise of adjudicative power of the tribunal under those specific circumstances.
446
  
The difference between jurisdiction and admissibility can also be analysed through 
consent.
447
 Under this approach, if a party to a dispute makes an objection to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal, it essentially claims that it has not consented to the jurisdiction 
of the tribunal to settle that particular dispute.
448
 Other procedural requirements relate to 
admissibility, and objections in this regard are made in cases where there is claimed to be a 
legal reason why the tribunal should decline to hear the case notwithstanding its 
jurisdiction.
449
 The jurisdiction of a tribunal must be examined by the tribunal itself, 
proprio motu, without a claim from the parties, whereas a claim of inadmissibility must be 
raised by one of the parties for the tribunal to examine its grounds.
450
 The latter is reflected 
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also in WTO jurisprudence, as the panels or the Appellate Body have not assessed the 
potential conflicts of jurisdictions when the parties have not raised such claims.
451
 
The jurisdiction versus admissibility categorisation was originally developed in the 
jurisprudence of the PCIJ
452
 and further by the ICJ
453
, and is now a recognised feature of 
international adjudication.
454
 To distinct these two concepts is not always an easy task, and 
also does not have practical importance in every situation.
455
 For example the ICJ stated in 
its Interhandel case that the objection made by the respondent on the jurisdiction of the 
Court on the basis of the claimant not having exhausted local remedies is in fact a question 
of admissibility, not jurisdiction.
456
 However, in the Northern Cameroons Case 
(Preliminary Objections) the ICJ stated that it does not find it necessary to determine 
which objections were objections to jurisdiction and which were objections to 
admissibility, when the parties to the dispute did not make a distinction between the two 
concepts.
457
 The WTO tribunals have not explicitly referred to the distinction, but it could 
be argued that the Appellate Body has recognised it in its jurisprudence. For example in 
Mexico – Soft Drinks the Appellate Body, quoting the Panel report, noted that Mexico did 
not claim that the Panel has no jurisdiction on the matter, but merely that it should not 
exercise it, thus referring to admissibility.
458
 In the same case the Appellate Body also 
referred to “legal impediments” which could render a case inadmissible in the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism even when the panel has jurisdiction in the matter.
459
 
4.2.2. Alternative solutions derived from the differentiation 
Are jurisdictional overlaps between the WTO and PTAs issues of jurisdiction or 
admissibility? According to Salles, jurisdictional issues arise when “the jurisdictional 
instruments or clauses of the forum that is examining the question expressly regulate the 
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procedural relationship between the forums at stake (as an issue of jurisdiction).”460 The 
objection would be based on the jurisdictional clauses upon which the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal is founded on.
461
  In contrast, Salles states that questions of admissibility are 
present where “procedural organization is indirect – the result of the application of a 
written procedure regulating norm unrelated to the authority of the tribunal examining the 
question, or of a general principle of law”.462  
Already based on this it can be concluded that claims based solely on the application of 
general principles of law, such as res judicata or lis pendens, are to be assessed as 
objections on admissibility also in the WTO system, as the WTO tribunals have, although 
implicitly, done so far.
463
 But what about cases where a defence is based on a PTA that 
includes a jurisdiction clause? This type of situations can be analysed from two 
perspectives. Firstly, the discussion on the inter se modifications to the WTO covered 
agreements can be analysed through the concept of jurisdiction, meaning that the disputing 
parties can contact out of the jurisdiction of the WTO by inter se modifying the DSU 
provisions.
464
 It could be argued that by contracting out of the jurisdiction of the WTO, the 
parties do not give their consent to the jurisdiction of the WTO as it is offered by the DSU 
if certain conditions, defined in the PTA clauses, are present. 
Following this route, the question would come down to conflict of norms, and the outcome 
of the conflict determines which tribunal has jurisdiction on the matter.
465
 The source of 
jurisdiction of an international tribunal stems from its constitutional instrument, through 
which the parties have granted their consent.
466
 A tribunal has therefore valid jurisdiction 
as long as the provisions establishing jurisdiction are valid, in other words as long as the 
treaty provisions are in force as for between the parties to the dispute.
467
 If inter se 
modifications were accepted to bind the WTO, it would mean that members are capable of 
eliminating the jurisdiction of the WTO tribunals as for between themselves through 
proper jurisdiction clauses included in PTAs, as the DSU provisions would not be 
applicable in the circumstances defined in the PTA jurisdiction clause. Therefore, it could 
be argued that, if the liberal view is correct and the applicability of PTA jurisdiction norms 
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is accepted, the jurisdiction of the WTO tribunal can be excluded. Following this 
reasoning, if the PTA norm “wins” the conflict and is deemed as the applicable norm in 
that situation by applying the conflict rules of international law, the WTO jurisdiction 
norms have to be set aside and therefore the WTO might have to decline jurisdiction 
altogether when the PTA clause so demands.
468
  
Another approach is to view this overlap as a question of admissibility. According to 
Salles, in situations where the objection is based on a norm “outside the purview of the 
principal jurisdiction of the tribunal facing the question”, the question is one of 
admissibility.
469
 From this viewpoint all jurisdiction clauses raise questions of 
admissibility and not jurisdiction before the WTO tribunals.
470
 The argument is that 
because action and process are independent of the jurisdiction of the tribunal, there might 
be legal circumstances which create a legal impediment for the exercise of jurisdiction, 
even though the tribunal has jurisdiction over the matter.
471
 This approach focuses on the 
procedural relationship of the parties and their ability to initiate a dispute in a specific 
forum, and not on the authority of the tribunal itself.
472
 Jurisdictional clauses included in 
PTAs prohibit the parties from initiating a dispute in the WTO dispute settlement, leading 
to the inadmissibility of the claim. The jurisdiction of the WTO is not questioned and it 
does not compete with the jurisdiction of the PTA. Following this approach, the DSU 
provisions and the jurisdiction clauses in PTAs are not considered to be in conflict, but the 
PTA norms are viewed as prohibitions for the parties.
473
 The panel can then exercise its 
inherent jurisdiction and decide not to rule on the merits due to the jurisdiction clause 
binding the parties. 
Because international tribunals are independent from each other and are established under 
different treaty regimes, they might not be too willing to decline jurisdiction in order to 
give way for the jurisdiction of other tribunals, as this might signal that one of the tribunals 
is a “supreme arbiter”.474 Therefore, making objections to the jurisdiction of a tribunal 
might not be the easiest route for excluding the possibilities for multiple litigation and 
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conflicting judgements. Salles argues that recognition of coordination between tribunals as 
procedural issues of admissibility would move the debate away from perspectives on 
conflicts of jurisdictions or even “clash of legal regimes”.475 Concentrating on questions of 
admissibility, more focus can be put on the actions and the conduct of the parties.
476
 It also 
enables coordination between tribunals more effectively while at the same time leaving the 
jurisdiction of the tribunals untouched and putting them on the “same footing”.477 The 
question of depriving a tribunal of jurisdiction would not arise, as the jurisdiction would 
remain intact, and the tribunal would just refrain from exercising it.
478
 Viewing the 
overlaps as issues of admissibility, the conditions for exercising jurisdiction are made on a 
case-by-case basis taking all aspects of the dispute and the conduct of the parties into 
consideration.
479
 This type of analysis underlines the logic of the doctrines of good faith 
and the abuse of process, which could be of use in this context.
480
  
This approach could also help the WTO tribunals to take jurisdiction invested in a PTA 
better under considerations when they risk multiple litigations or when a PTA includes a 
jurisdiction clause limiting the jurisdiction of the WTO. Under these circumstances, the 
jurisdiction clause or a previous ruling of a PTA tribunal on the same matter could be seen 
as a legal impediment, in which case the tribunal should decline to exercise jurisdiction on 
the basis of inadmissibility. This would prevent the whole dispute on conflict of norms and 
mandatory jurisdiction of the WTO, and also allow the panels to assess each situation on a 
case-by-case basis, making sure that the parties will have their chance to adjudicate at least 
in one forum. It would also mean that the WTO would not have to accept the jurisdiction 
of PTAs to overrule its own. Following this approach, the parties would have to make an 
objection to the admissibility, and the WTO would not have to address the issue on its own 
initiative.
481
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4.3. Case law regarding the jurisdiction of the WTO tribunals – Any lessons learned? 
From the ongoing discussion and conflicting views on the issue of the overlapping 
jurisdictions between the WTO and PTAs, it is evident that the problems arising from these 
potential conflicts have not been settled in the jurisprudence of the WTO. Some 
conclusions can however be made based on the statements of the panels and the Appellate 
Body. WTO panels and the Appellate Body have addressed the applicability of general 
principles of law to the jurisdiction of the WTO in their jurisprudence, but they have not 
been directly faced with the question of jurisdictional clauses and their effects in the WTO 
system.  
I will now turn to examining case law regarding the issue of overlapping jurisdictions 
between the WTO and PTAs. I will start with the most referred case in this context, Mexico 
– Soft Drinks, where the question of panel’s competence to decline jurisdiction was 
addressed. Second, I will move on to study Argentina – Poultry, where the complainant 
initiated the WTO dispute settlement system with a case already settled in the PTA dispute 
settlement system. I will then follow up with EC – Aircraft and analyse the panel’s 
capabilities to consider procedural waivers. Lastly, I will study the most recent case 
relevant to this issue, Peru – Agricultural Products, where Peru alleged that the 
complainant breached its good faith –obligations by bringing the case to the WTO dispute 
settlement system.  
4.3.1. Mexico – Soft Drinks  
Mexico – Soft Drinks was about measures imposed by Mexico on soft drinks and other 
beverages using non-cane sugar sweeteners.
482
 The dispute was part of a larger dispute 
between the United States and Mexico concerning the market for sweeteners in North 
America.
483
 Mexico attempted to initiate a dispute against the United States under the 
NAFTA already in 2000, but the United States prevented the establishment of the NAFTA 
panel and thereby blocked the proceedings altogether.
484
 The actions taken by both parties 
finally lead to the proceedings in question under the WTO dispute settlement system.
485
 It 
has to be noted however, that neither the subject-matter nor the positions of the parties 
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were the same under the NAFTA proceedings and the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. Under the NAFTA proceedings, the complainant was Mexico and the disputed 
measure was an import ban imposed by the United States, whereas in the WTO 
proceedings the complainant was the United States and the dispute concerned a tax 
measure imposed by the Mexico on US products.
486
 In the WTO proceedings, Mexico 
requested that the Panel would decline to exercise jurisdiction, basing its claim on the 
pending NAFTA proceedings.
487
  
In the case, the Appellate Body examined its powers to exercise jurisdiction by referring to 
several articles of the DSU.
488
 It stated that it had no discretion to decide whether it could 
exercise validly established jurisdiction in the absence of a legal impediment.
489
 What such 
a legal impediment could be was left undetermined, but it was clearly stated that it did not 
exist under the circumstances at hand. The Appellate Body referred to the prohibition of 
adding to or diminishing the rights and obligations of members by stating that “[a] decision 
by a panel to decline to exercise validly established jurisdiction would seem to "diminish" 
the right of a complaining member to "seek the redress of a violation of obligations" within 
the meaning of Article 23 of the DSU, and to bring a dispute pursuant to Article 3.3 of the 
DSU”.490 
The ruling could be seen as detrimental to the whole question of preventing multiple 
litigations or excluding the jurisdiction of the WTO. In my opinion this is however not the 
case. The Appellate Body took good care of spelling out the fact that firstly, Mexico did 
not claim that the WTO had no jurisdiction on the matter
491
 and secondly, that Mexico did 
not claim that there were legal obligations under the NAFTA or any other international 
agreement which might raise legal impediments for the Panel to hear the case.
 492
 Mexico 
only submitted that the Panel should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction due to the case 
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being part of a broader dispute already initiated under the NAFTA dispute settlement 
system.
493
  
Firstly, no conclusions can be drawn to questions of jurisdiction based on this ruling 
because the possibility to exclude the jurisdiction of the WTO was not addressed at all. As 
all the parties, Mexico included, agreed that the Panel did indeed have jurisdiction on the 
matter, the Panel and the Appellate Body only addressed the issue of exercising this 
jurisdiction. Secondly, regarding admissibility, both the Panel and the Appellate Body 
stated that they “express no view as to whether there may be other circumstances in which 
legal impediments could exist that would preclude a panel from ruling on the merits of the 
claims that are before it”.494 This means that they did not exclude the possibility of 
objecting admissibility of a case, but merely that the circumstances of this specific case did 
not render the case inadmissible. What is more, the Appellate Body explicitly stated that 
the relevance of Article 2005:6 of the NAFTA, which contains the jurisdiction clauses 
limiting the jurisdiction of the WTO under certain circumstances, was not at issue and that 
it did not express any view as to whether it might have changed the assessment.
495
 Neither 
the Panel nor the Appellate Body took any stand in determining whether the question 
would be of jurisdiction or admissibility if such jurisdiction clauses were considered.
496
 
As noted above, the measure was not the same under the NAFTA and the WTO 
proceedings, and also the NAFTA proceedings were blocked by the USA. What can be 
concluded from the case is that in order for a party to object to the admissibility of a case, 
there has to be a specific legal impediment that would make it inappropriate for the panel 
to exercise jurisdiction. Basing such objection on a jurisdiction clause included in a PTA, 
perhaps combined with a claim based on a general principle of international law could well 
be considered to establish such legal impediment. Even authors in support of the more 
conservative approach as to the non-WTO law penetrating into the decision-making of 
WTO tribunals show some support to this approach. Marceau and Wyatt have stated that in 
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the light of the Mexico – Soft Drinks case, an exclusive forum selection clause might bring 
clarity to the issue, and also that the applicability of such clause was not excluded in the 
case.
497
 Van Damme is also of the view that the Appellate Body hinted that the panels 
could have the inherent power to decline to exercise jurisdiction, although it did not in fact 
confirm this either.
498
 
4.3.2. Argentina – Poultry 
Argentina – Poultry concerned anti-dumping duties imposed by Argentina against the 
importation of poultry from Brazil.
499
 Prior to initiating the dispute in the WTO dispute 
settlement system, Brazil had already challenged the measure before an ad hoc arbitral 
tribunal established under the MERCOSUR agreement. Argentina disputed the jurisdiction 
of the Panel on the basis that Brazil had not acted in good faith in bringing the case before 
two different fora.
 
Argentina based its claim on the principle of estoppel, which was 
already examined above in 3.1.2., and therefore I will not return to the issue here. It will 
suffice to say that based on this ruling, the position of estoppel in the WTO system is 
unclear, but the Panel did not exclude the possibility to its application. 
As for the possible effects of jurisdictional clauses included in PTAs, the Panel did make a 
statement that is somewhat relevant to this issue, even though it did not have to evaluate 
their relevance directly. The Panel stated that especially because the Protocol of Brasilia, 
which was the agreement regulating the disputes under the MERCOSUR agreement at the 
time the first dispute was settled, did not include any restrictions for the parties to initiate 
the same dispute under the WTO dispute settlement, Brazil had not waived its rights 
arising from the DSU.
500
 The Protocol of Brasilia had been replaced by the Protocol of 
Olivos, but did not yet bind the members during the procedures.
501
 The Protocol of Olivos, 
which is still in force, included a fork-in-the-road clause, specifically excluding the right to 
initiate a subsequent case either in the WTO or MERCOSUR dispute settlement system if 
the same case had already been brought in the other forum.
502
 Basing its assessment on 
this, the Panel stated that “[i]ndeed, the fact that parties to MERCOSUR saw the need to 
introduce the Protocol of Olivos suggests to us that they recognised that (in the absence of 
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such Protocol) a MERCOSUR dispute settlement proceeding could be followed by a WTO 
dispute settlement proceeding in respect of the same measure”.503 
The assessment regarded the question of whether Brazil had waived its right to bring a 
subsequent case to the WTO dispute settlement. Under those circumstances the answer was 
that it had not. Following the logic of the Panel, had the Protocol included such a 
jurisdiction clause, it might have affected the assessment of the issue. The ruling did not 
address the applicability of jurisdiction clauses, so no direct conclusions can be made. 
However, even though the decision does not contain any clear guidance as to the possible 
effects such a jurisdiction clause could have on the jurisdiction of the WTO, the Panel left 
the door open for later claims on such clauses.
504
 This ruling has been interpreted to 
indicate the Panel’s willingness to apply jurisdiction clauses in PTAs.505  
It also seems that Argentina’s claim was based on and was also analysed from the point of 
view of admissibility and not jurisdiction. The question was whether Brazil had waived its 
right to initiate the dispute settlement of the WTO and was therefore estopped from 
bringing the case there, and not whether the WTO had jurisdiction to rule on the merits. 
This is in line with the abovementioned discussion, which concluded that issues of general 
principles of law raise objections to admissibility, not to jurisdiction of a tribunal. 
4.3.3. EC – Aircraft 
The question of the effects of a mutually agreed solution and a waiver was addressed in EC 
– Aircraft in relation to a claim based on the estoppel principle. The case was about 
subsidies granted by the European Communities and certain of its member countries to 
Airbus large civil aircraft.
506
 The European Communities based its response on an 
agreement concluded between the parties in 1992 regarding large civil aircraft programmes 
which, among other things, included a provision where the parties agreed to avoid conflicts 
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and litigation. The European Communities argued that the provisions of the agreement 
were directly applicable in the case.
507
 It also argued that the agreement created an estoppel 
against the United States, because the parties had reached a mutually agreed solution to 
avoid trade conflicts on matters covered by it.
508
 According to the European Communities, 
the United States should not have been permitted to challenge subsidies which were part of 
an agreement which the United States had itself contributed to and in which the legality of 
support to large civil aircraft was determined.
509
 
The Panel noted that the European Communities effectively stated that the United States 
had waived its rights to challenge certain measures in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings.
510
 According to the Panel, the question therefore came down to “whether it is 
possible for a Member to have waived its rights under the WTO Agreements in an 
agreement which it entered into prior to entering into the WTO Agreements, and if so, 
whether and on what basis a WTO panel could enforce such a waiver.”511 The Panel then 
recalled the Article 23 of the DSU and the right of every member to initiate the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism. The Panel went on to saying that "[a]ssuming, for the sake 
of argument, that a Member can waive its rights under the WTO Agreements pursuant to a 
non-WTO Agreement, we cannot conceive that a Member can be considered to have 
waived such rights by means of an agreement which it entered into prior to entering into 
the WTO Agreements.”512 It also stated that “[e]ven if it were somehow possible to find 
that a Member had prospectively waived certain of its rights under the WTO Agreements 
in a prior Agreement in the manner contended for by the European Communities (a 
contention which we reject), and assuming such waiver were enforceable in WTO dispute 
settlement (an issue which we need not and do not decide), any such waiver would need to 
be clear and unambiguous.”513 The Panel did not consider that the provision to “seek to 
avoid conflicts and litigation” related to the WTO dispute settlement at all, but merely 
concerned domestic trade laws. The Panel therefore concluded that it did not find any basis 
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for the claim that the United States had waived its rights to challenge the measure in the 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
514
 
The statement of the Panel regarding the possibility to enforce a waiver can be criticised. If 
the Panel would have found that the United States did not have the right to challenge the 
measures in the WTO dispute settlement and the Panel would have declined to exercise 
jurisdiction based on this, it would not have been enforcing the non-WTO agreement, but it 
would have decided not to rule on the merits due to the complainant’s obligations arising 
from that agreement. This is the issue of the distinction between the applicable law and 
jurisdiction, which was addressed above at 2.4.2. The question is therefore not about the 
enforceability of a non-WTO agreement, but of the applicable law before the WTO 
tribunal. 
However, two things can be concluded here. Firstly, the Panel found that at least 
agreements established prior to the founding of the WTO cannot waive the rights provided 
by the covered agreements. Taking into consideration the fact that some PTAs, for 
example the NAFTA, came into force before the WTO was established, this could create 
obstacles for the jurisdiction clauses included in them. Secondly, the Panel found that if 
members’ rights arising from the covered agreements can be effectively waived, the 
agreement by which the waiver is based on has to be clear and unambiguous. This is 
effectively the same criterion that was presented already in Argentina – Poultry in relation 
to the estoppel principle. Such jurisdiction clauses that are aimed to regulate the allocation 
of jurisdiction between the WTO and PTAs are likely to be drafted in such a way that 
fulfils these criteria. 
However, the wording of the Panel’s decision shows that the question was again purposely 
left open. Also, the European Union did not attempt to dispute the jurisdiction of the Panel, 
and also did not claim that the Panel should decline from exercising jurisdiction. The 
purpose of the claim was to request the Panel to find that based on the agreement and the 
mutually agreed solution regarding large civil aircraft, the subsidies granted would not be 
found to violate the relevant WTO provisions. When comparing jurisdiction clauses found 
in PTAs and the wording of the 1992 agreement aiming to avoid conflicts and litigation, it 
can easily be seen that the two are not comparable in terms of showing the purpose behind 
the provisions and the will of the members. The Panel did not make any clear findings on 
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whether the 1992 agreement could have been directly applicable and also on whether a 
non-WTO agreement could be found to create an estoppel to the claimant to initiate the 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 
4.3.4. Peru – Agricultural Products 
In Peru – Agricultural Products Peru argued that the respondent Guatemala had waived its 
right to challenge Peru’s Price Range System (PRS) in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings. Guatemala claimed that the PRS system resulted to the imposition of an 
additional duty on imports of certain agricultural products, such as rice, sugar, maize, milk 
and certain dairy products.
515
 The parties had signed a PTA, which allegedly allowed Peru 
to maintain its WTO-inconsistent PRS. Peru had however not ratified the PTA at the time 
of the dispute. Peru argued that Guatemala had not initiated the dispute settlement 
proceedings in good faith as it had accepted the maintenance of the PRS in the PTA 
between the parties, and therefore acted contrary to its obligations under Articles 3.7 and 
3.10 of the DSU.
516
 
The Appellate Body did not exclude the possibility of waiving DSU rights, but it did note 
that such waivers must be made clearly.
517
 Peru based its claim on Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of 
the DSU and argued that the PTA text provided a mutually agreed solution not to initiate 
the WTO dispute settlement system with regard to the PRS. The Appellate Body firstly 
stated that the PTA text could not constitute a mutually agreed solution as it was 
inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture, and Article 3.7 calls for the solution to be 
WTO consistent.
518
 The Appellate Body also noted that there was ambiguity between the 
parties as to what was actually agreed in the PTA with regard to the PRS, and therefore 
there seemed to be no mutually agreed solution in the first place.
519
 Secondly, the 
Appellate Body stated that Peru had not even claimed that Guatemala was “procedurally 
barred” from challenging the PRS in the WTO dispute settlement.520 Furthermore, the PTA 
included a jurisdiction clause that allowed the complainant to choose the forum for 
disputes.
521
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The Appellate Body did not consider that Guatemala had breached its good 
faith -obligations under Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU. However, the claim was based 
on a substantial modification to the WTO covered agreements, and Peru alleged that 
Guatemala had waived its right to initiate the WTO dispute settlement system based on this 
modification to the Agreement on Agriculture. The parties had not made a specific 
agreement to modify their DSU rights and obligations. I agree with the Appellate Body on 
its conclusions, and I also do not consider that the case creates any limitations to the 
effectiveness of jurisdiction clauses in PTAs. As the alleged modification was made with 
regard to the Agreement on Agriculture, I see no reason why the PRS could not be 
challenged in the WTO system. The question whether the Appellate Body should consider 
this modification as applicable law and allow the PRS regardless of its WTO inconsistency 
is a separate question. 
The Appellate Body’s statement regarding the WTO-consistency of a mutually agreed 
solution might raise issues, but in my opinion this refers to solutions made in individual 
cases with regard to substantial norms, and should not create limitations to general 
procedural agreements between members. Therefore, nothing in the Appellate Body’s 
reasoning creates any limitations to the use of jurisdiction clauses in PTAs. A fork-in-the-
road clause that has been exercised by the complainant before the initiation of the WTO 
procedures would create a clear statement not to initiate the dispute settlement procedures. 
It could therefore create a basis for example for an argument based on a breach of a 
member’s good faith obligations under Article 3.10 of the DSU, creating a legal 
impediment to the exercise of panel’s jurisdiction, and therefore rendering the case 
inadmissible. 
4.4. Concluding remarks on the scope of the jurisdiction of WTO tribunals 
It can be concluded that for the moment the powers of the WTO panels to decline 
jurisdiction or to determine that a case is inadmissible are neither confirmed not 
excluded.
522
 I argue that jurisdiction clauses included in PTAs can create such legal 
impediments required by the Appellate Body in Mexico – Soft Drinks. Jurisdiction clauses 
create clear and unambiguous statements of intent, they bind the members and if the PTA 
is WTO-consistent, it is also legal. The legal impediment could be the jurisdiction clause 
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itself in a case of a preferential clause excluding the jurisdiction of the WTO tribunal 
altogether, such as Articles 2005(4) and (3) of NAFTA.  
These clauses are however rare, and more relevant would be to accept the effects of clauses 
prohibiting simultaneous or parallel proceedings. In this respect perhaps the most 
compelling approach is to challenge the WTO proceedings on the basis of members’ good 
faith obligation under Article 3.10 of the DSU after the complainant has already exercised 
its rights granted by PTA jurisdiction clause in accordance with the approach suggested by 
Nantes and Descheemaeker. The legal impediment would not in this case be the 
jurisdiction clause itself, but the fact that the claimant breaches a substantive provision of 
the WTO by bringing a claim after already exercising its rights under the PTA clause. The 
jurisdiction clause would be used as a means of interpreting Article 3.10 of the DSU.
523
 
This approach is consistent with the panels’ findings in Argentina – Poultry and EC – 
Aircraft as well as with the Appellate Body’s views in Mexico – Soft Drink and Peru – 
Agricultural Products. 
In the interest of preventing multiple simultaneous or subsequent proceedings over the 
same dispute, I suggest that the WTO panels should decline to exercise jurisdiction at least 
when (1) there is a clear and unambiguous jurisdiction clause in a PTA which has been 
exercised (2) which is used as a basis for a claim based on a general principle of law such 
as estoppel, comity or good faith, and (3) the jurisdiction of the WTO is not disputed, but 
the respondent bases its claim on the inadmissibility of the case.  
As the claim would be based on the inadmissibility of the case, the WTO tribunal would 
not have to accept that its jurisdiction can be excluded, and also it would not have to accept 
that a PTA norm could overrule a WTO norm. The biggest issues could therefore be 
avoided. Even if PTA jurisdiction clauses would not be found to exclude the jurisdiction of 
the WTO as such, read together with general principles of international law creating 
procedural limits for multiple litigations, they could indeed be considered to prevent the 
WTO proceedings and in that way also be effective in the relations between the PTA 
members. The willingness of the WTO tribunals to accept this approach remains to be 
seen. 
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5. Open questions and growing concerns – What should the WTO do?  
What can be concluded from all of the aspects studied above is that currently there is no 
definite answer to the question asked in the beginning of this paper; in other words the 
current state of law does not inform us whether the jurisdiction of the WTO can be 
excluded for the benefit of PTA jurisdiction, or whether the WTO tribunals can decline to 
exercise jurisdiction. It is obvious that the WTO panels would not decline jurisdiction (or 
the exercise of jurisdiction) lightly, so in case the question ever arises again in WTO 
litigation, the claim (or, as it would be the respondent who disputes the jurisdiction, the 
respond) has to be well grounded and reasoned.  
Kwak and Marceau have drawn a clear picture of what is possible to happen, at least under 
current state of the law, as a result of overlapping WTO and PTA jurisdictions: if a WTO 
panel accepts jurisdiction notwithstanding the jurisdiction vested in a PTA tribunal, the 
PTA member initiating the WTO dispute may be violating its PTA obligations regarding 
dispute settlement between the PTA members. In these circumstances, the other party may 
claim that the WTO dispute is violating its rights under the PTA, and quite likely also win 
the dispute in the PTA dispute settlement. At least theoretically, that PTA member would 
be entitled to retaliation,
524
 the value of which could even amount to the benefits the other 
party has possibly received in the WTO proceedings.
525
 This can hardly be considered as a 
desirable course of events, and one can only imagine how much the parties would have 
invested in those parallel proceedings. As has already been noted, it is also very possible 
that the different tribunals come to different conclusions and make incompatible decisions 
on the same dispute.  
The biggest issue is where to draw the line between the right of members to have their case 
heard and the abuse of rights in parallel litigation. It is practically impossible for members 
to block proceedings in the WTO,
526
 but in the PTA dispute settlement systems this might 
be possible. If the WTO declined jurisdiction, the member might not get access to court at 
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all, as could have been the case in the “sugar wars” that took place between Mexico and 
the United States under the NAFTA. WTO dispute settlement has been argued to be more 
effective in many ways than PTA dispute settlement systems
527
 and this may well be true. 
In fact, the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO is generally considered to be a 
success.
528
 The WTO system has been considered to be in many cases more 
“sophisticated” in terms of superior rules, to have a better enforcement mechanism and to 
be more legitimate than PTA dispute settlement due to the neutrality of panellists and the 
appellate review function. Also, the WTO system is rule-based and not power-based as 
PTA systems usually are, meaning that the “size” of the opponent should not affect the 
result in WTO litigation.
529
 At least so far many PTAs have preferred diplomatically 
oriented dispute settlement systems as opposed to rule-based systems.
530
  
Whatever the conclusion is in terms of what the relationship between the dispute 
settlement systems ought to be, the issue of overlapping jurisdictions should be clarified in 
order to avoid uncertainty and to promote coherence. Many authors have stated that the 
issue should be clarified, preferably by the members. It has been suggested that members 
could use the ongoing Doha negotiating mandate to resolve this issue and create clear rules 
for addressing the potential conflict situations.
531
 Marceau and Wyatt have stated that the 
best alternatives to tackle the problem would be to either amend the relevant WTO 
provisions or adopt a General Council decision on the issue.
532
 Pauwelyn has mentioned 
the possibility to use authoritative interpretations and waivers in clarifying the relationship 
between WTO and non-WTO norms.
533
 Marceau and Wyatt however also stress that 
clarifying the situation for the benefit of PTA dispute settlement mechanisms might not be 
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an easy task, as some smaller, especially developing countries, might not be willing to 
transfer that much jurisdiction to PTA dispute settlement bodies, as it could be detrimental 
especially to smaller states.
534
  
As for the opposite direction, Cottier and Foltea have noted that nothing in public 
international law would prevent the WTO members from stating the primacy of WTO 
norms over PTA rules.
535
 This would probably be applicable in the context of dispute 
settlement as well. Whatever the result is, it would be best if the members themselves 
would decide how the issue should be clarified, as international tribunals in general cannot 
exceed their jurisdiction and they especially cannot legislate.
536
 The WTO tribunal 
declining to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of jurisdiction of a PTA could even be seen 
as guilty of judicial activism.
537
  As the PTAs continue to proliferate and grow in 
significance, it is important to finally resolve the relationship between the two systems.  
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